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rounDinG With the eDitor
As Only Makes Sense, We Are Evolving
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the Journal of Hospital Ethics (JOHE) 
4.2 on Neuroethics. This issue, developed from 
beginning to end by Christian Carrozzo, is the first 
issue in which he and I are running the journal 
remotely. In addition to his assignment with the 
John J. Lynch MD Center for Ethics at MedStar 
Washington Hospital Center (hereafter referred to 
as “the Center”), Christian is now with the Depart-
ment of Philosophy at SUNY Albany, where he is 
working on his doctorate. I shall leave the proper 
introduction to this issue to him.
 Here, I would like to comment a bit about 
how amazing (and amazingly simple) it is to work 
remotely. Whether an academic or clinician, work-
ing with colleagues across the country or around 
the globe, one notices little difference than simply 
having them in another building on the far side 
of a sprawling campus like ours. Today, we often 
make central to our work whatever communication 
exists through the now standard use of email and 
teleconferencing, while supplementing the ways 
in which we can work effectively while distanced 
with text messaging, Facetime, Skype, and a seem-
ingly infinite array of similar applications. These 
technologies vastly improve communication for a 
wonderfully rich, far-flung community of mutually 
interested others.
 The vastness of our global clinical bioethics 
community was in plain view most recently at 
the International Conference on Clinical Ethics 
Consultation (ICCEC) 2016, which we at the Center 
had the pleasure and privilege to host. Twenty-six 
countries were represented. The richness of the 
interactions among colleagues who spoke so many 
different languages was spectacular. 
 Many presentations included persons from 
different states and countries focused on the same 
or similar issues. During a session that included 
only persons from Colorado, ICCEC 2016 became 
the public announcement event for Colorado state 
legislation that finally passed just a few days before 
the ICCEC meeting. This legislation was the result 
of years of work by a statewide coalition and al-
lows a hospital physician, not caring for a patient, 
to serve as surrogate decision-maker in situations 
where no one else (ie, no family, friends, or guard-
ian) can be found or appointed. 
 The issue of hospital care and discharge of 
homeless patients arose repeatedly throughout the 
meeting. Of course, dependent upon where around 
the world, or which region of the United States 
(US) was represented, the numbers of homeless 
patients, and thus severity of the issue, varied. 
Nonetheless, the contours of the problems were 
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comparable everywhere. As a result of so many 
similarly focused sessions, on the last day of the 
meeting a new idea emerged that holds out the 
promise for (at least a partial) solution in various 
US states and countries around the world.
 The notion involves working with, at mini-
mum, local social service agencies, departments 
of housing and health, local hospital associations, 
realtors and undoubtedly others to establish a 
network of residential buildings willing to sub-
sidize small apartments and the employment of 
 As the national and international work of the 
Center evolves, it only makes sense that JOHE is 
evolving also. This is especially true following 
our most recent Editorial Advisory Board meet-
ing, held March 14, 2016. The best news out of 
the meeting is that our Board is very happy with 
the continual improvements in the quality of con-
tent. Quality of content is always our first order 
of business and we were greatly pleased to hear 
such comments on this point. On the other hand, 
our ability to produce JOHE on schedule has been 
nurses and social workers, to house capacitated, 
previously homeless patients. The tenants would 
be capacitated person discharged from a hospital 
who would be able to live independently in a small 
apartment with a little supervision and assistance. 
Staffing such a building, including only a very few 
such residents, with a nurse and/or social worker, 
could allow those patients who don’t want to be 
discharged to homelessness and have no other op-
tion to be sheltered more satisfactorily and safely 
upon discharge. 
 The idea took shape in talking about creat-
ing a coalition among clinical bioethicists and 
others starting with Washington, DC, and New 
York. However, the beauty of being able to work 
remotely is exemplified by what happened as 
part of this open discussion with the remaining 
meeting participants. A physicist from India who 
works in cancer research came over to me when 
the meeting was breaking up and the discussion 
was over (we at the Center have volunteered to 
begin convening the coalition) and said he would 
like to be included. He explained that he has re-
ceived funding to construct a small building in 
which his laboratory and clinical research is to be 
housed and he thought, perhaps, he might be able 
to configure a few rooms in this building to house 
homeless cancer patients. A fabulous idea almost 
immediately layered on top of the original one. As 
this coalition takes shape and makes progress, we 
will be certain to keep our JOHE readers posted.
a continued challenge. To assist us in doing so I 
am very happy to report that production of the 
completed manuscript will now be in the able and 
steady hands of the University Publishing Group 
and its President, Leslie LeBlanc. This issue will 
have been the first to be produced by UPG and we 
look forward to our new collaboration. 
 Now that the post-manuscript preparation 
production functions of JOHE are moving to a pro-
fessional publisher, we would like to thank Cath-
erine Avery for her many years of devoted service. 
Once she taught Christian everything she could, 
she turned to being focused exclusively on the 
management and production aspects of the journal 
and continued to be the glue that held this project 
together. I want to thank Catherine sincerely. Dur-
ing JOHE’s incipiency, she and I slogged through 
the vertical learning curve together. There would 
be no JOHE without her.
 Jean Wilhelmsen-Exter, our graphic designer, 
will also be departing JOHE’s Editorial Group as we 
begin our collaboration with UPG. Jean was often 
invisible to the rest of us because it was she and 
Catherine who worked out all the design issues 
from the start. I have known Jean for a long time 
and we thank her for everything she has done for 
JOHE throughout these years.
 Next, I would like to welcome Kahlia Kéita, the 
Center’s newest Ethics Educator, taking over the 
management and further development of educa-
tion programming once directed and/or developed 
As the national and international work 
of the Center evolves, it only makes sense 
that JOHE is evolving also. 
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by Christian prior to his move. Kahlia, who holds 
a master’s in bioethics from Loyola, Chicago and is 
presently attending law school at the University of 
the District of Columbia (UDC), is our newly titled 
journal Administrator. She has the big job of keep-
ing track of everything from editorial timelines to 
fulfillment.
 We would also like to say thank you and good-
bye to Nneka Sederstrom, whose idea it was for 
the Center to produce a MedStar focused bioethics 
publication. As JOHE’s Executive Director, she 
supported the production and funding of this jour-
nal from the outset. Nneka has now taken on the 
important job of building a clinical ethics program 
at Children’s Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota 
Hospital. We wish her much success.
 I am pleased to report that Norine McGrath, 
MD, has become the third Director of the Center. 
She is a physician with MWHC’s Emergency De-
partment group. She has been the Chairperson of 
the hospital’s ethics committee since 2012, when 
Jack Lynch, MD, our beloved and now deceased 
Medical Director, retired from that position. Jack 
 As to JOHE content evolution, the original 
strategy was been to create issues tightly designed 
around specific conceptual topics (issue 1 of a vol-
ume), a therapeutic area (issue 2 of a volume) and a 
policy or departmental focus (issue 3 of a volume). 
We all have decided, under Christian’s leadership 
on working through these editorial changes, that 
these constraints limit our ability to identify excel-
lent thinkers and writers about hospital clinical 
bioethics whose work is, of its own original devel-
opment, both intellectually appropriate and timely, 
whether or not it can be accommodated into our 
concurrent, working “theme,” or not. That is, we 
believe that JOHE ought to yield its content deci-
sions to the work of those who propose the most 
pressing, relevant, and normative considerations 
about hospital clinical ethics. 
 My thanks go to Richard Benson, MD, Associ-
ate Medical Director of the Comprehensive Stroke 
Center here at MWHC, for being so helpful in the 
development of the In Practice section of this issue. 
Richard and I work together all the time; our clini-
cal ethics consultation service often assists him 
established the ethics committee in 1982 and was 
chairperson himself intermittently for all those 
years. 
 Norine, as Center Director, now also becomes 
JOHE’s Executive Director. Some have asked why 
an academic journal such as JOHE needs an Ex-
ecutive Director, but we feel strongly that JOHE 
does. The Executive Director is the last person to 
read the manuscript before it goes into production. 
Given the number of potentially controversial is-
sues addressed by JOHE’s authors, it is critically 
important that we have someone else’s eyes on our 
work. As Editor-in-Chief, it is good to know that 
someone who is a step away from our work and 
the journal itself has had the opportunity to raise 
any red flags that might only be seen with fresh 
eyes. 
untangling the care of some of our most ethically 
complicated and vulnerable patients. He’s a great 
neurologist, technically excellent, and ethically 
sensitive.
 Also, I want to thank Christian Carrozzo for 
his special devotion to this issue. In general, there 
would be no JOHE without him. But because of 
his own intellectual interest in neuroethics, this 
issue has been a special one for him and for us. For 
some, neuroethics does not immediately conjure 
up images of clinical hospital care. But Christian 
has a special gift (among many) for seeing what is 
relevant in even the most profoundly theoretical 
and often seemingly distant from clinical bio-
ethical issues and he has elegantly connected this 
highly complex work to the everyday business of 
the hospital. 
 JOHE ought to yield its content decisions 
to the work of those who propose the most pressing, 
relevant, and normative considerations 
about hospital clinical ethics. 
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 Finally, and just as we go to press, the Center 
is being named the John J. Lynch MD Center for 
Ethics at MedStar Washington Hospital Center. For 
this, I want to thank Gregory Argyros, MD, Senior 
Vice President of Medical Affairs and Chief Medi-
cal Officer, MedStar Washington Hospital Center. 
This name change has been a long time coming. 
Thankfully, Jack knew about the dedication be-
fore he suddenly died earlier this year. That Dr. 
Argyros finally shepherded this through all the 
leadership levels at MedStar Corporate to the final 
signature of Ken Sammett, FACHE, President and 
CEO of MedStar, is a testament to Greg’s respect 
for Jack and everyone’s recognition of Jack being 
the champion of ethics at MWHC for all of his 52 
years with the hospital. 
 Let us now turn to JOHE: Neuroethics and a 
special introduction by Christian Carrozzo. We 
hope you enjoy this special issue.
Evan
Evan G. DeRenzo, PhD
Editor-in-Chief
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FeAtures
Neuroethics is often given a two-sided definition.1-3 
On the one hand, it is described as the subfield of 
bioethics that more narrowly focuses on complexi-
ties arising from the moral evaluation of the use 
of neurologic technologies intended to diagnose, 
treat, ‘enhance,’ or sustain neurologic function. 
Moral relevance here often takes the form of in-
dividual or communal value positions within a 
relevant complex leading to legitimate normative 
debate over courses of action in social and politi-
cal realms, as well as at the bedside. On the other 
hand, its sufficient distinctness from bioethics has 
been attributed to what neuroscientific advances 
may be able to tell us in a very privileged and 
direct way about the moral nature of ourselves 
as minded beings. With this latter distinction we 
might also ask the question of whether neuroeth-
ics, as a field distinctly positioned and equipped to 
interpret the moral significance of neuroscientific 
advances, carries itself the moral task of assisting 
the ethical subject in accommodating new belief 
systems that oppose those grounded in religion or 
folk psychology.4,5 
 Indeed, what has resulted in the academic 
distinction between neuroethics and bioethics, 
at least, has been the former’s intimate relation-
ship with properly philosophic questions that 
relate to our self-apprehension as minded as well 
as moral beings in light of actual or hypothetical 
advances in neuroscience. In particular, notions 
Neuroethics, Moral Agency, and the Hard Problem:
A Special Introduction to the Neuroethics Edition 
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involving moral responsibility and determinism, 
moral worth and personhood, and even what 
some have argued are the metaphysical (essential) 
properties necessary to be considered human. The 
latter comes into question in bioethics and the 
philosophy of science in debates over ‘humans’ 
as a biological class of organisms and what hap-
pens when the ‘essential’ biological functions of 
the class are altered by the introduction of some 
biotechnology. Relatedly, is it appropriate to claim 
that such alterations specific to neurologic func-
tion can affect human moral judgment, or ought 
they be understood as merely changes in biological 
function whose associated changes in behavior are 
then to be evaluated independently and contextu-
ally for moral relevance?6 
 All physicalist theories of mind contend 
as a matter of metaphysical commitment that 
whatever the mind is, and whether or not we can 
theoretically reduce it to a description of micro-
physiologic processes, nevertheless supervenes 
on the physical. The assumption in effect here is 
an appeal to the generality of physics; an underly-
ing notion that commits to a physical ontology in 
relation to the mind. Some theorists take this to 
suggest that questions surrounding the mind-body 
relation, rest assured, can and will be explained 
by a scientific theory grounded in physical law. 
Others are content with the mere metaphysical 
claim that whatever the mind is (and, sometimes, 
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whether we should be using ‘mental’ concepts and 
language to understand consciousness, at all), it 
shares physical identity with the brain. That is, 
in a very real and physical sense, the mind is an 
aspect of the brain. One way of understanding this 
notion is the following: 
 Think of a flock of birds viewed from a fair 
distance (see figure 1). Together, they form a pat-
tern or figure (supervening higher-level property/
mental state). Each and 
every instance of a bird 
(token lower-level prop-
erty/neurologic event), 
however, is not evident 
as part of the figure. 
The figure thus appears 
while not able to be de-
fined by its lower level 
properties (instances of 
birds).
 From this, we can 
see how a supervening 
figure or pattern un-
dergoing sufficient al-
teration from its lower 
level property activity could appear itself to cause 
another figure or pattern to emerge when appre-
hended from a particular perspective. I have used 
this example to argue against mental causation in 
a non-reductive model of consciousness; that is, 
against the notion that mental states (higher level 
properties) themselves play a causal role in our 
everyday conscious actions. If the mind is thusly 
a higher level supervening aspect of the brain, 
multiply realized from lower level property activ-
ity although irreducible to it, then much like the 
emerging figure in relation to the flock, mental 
states themselves can be understood as non-causal 
while causation is sufficiently provided by lower 
level neurologic activity. The mind emerges from 
that activity in what we experience as irreducible, 
phenomenal states. For our purposes here, the 
figure illustrates the supervening relationship be-
tween consciousness (mental states and properties) 
and the brain (neurologic events and properties). 
 Although by way of this example we arrive 
at a conclusion that renders higher level proper-
ties non-causal, there are those who argue for the 
causal properties of mental states by understand-
ing the relation of supervenience to be between 
higher level abstract computational structures 
which are functionally distinguished and realized 
by lower level neurologic events and properties. 
In this picture of supervenience, the higher level 
abstract structure is presupposed a causal system, 
as mental states are defined, functionally. Like 
other non-reductive models, such structures have 
physical identity (mental states are identified with 
functional roles played out by neurophysiological 
structures), multiple realizability (such systems 
come to be by way of many different neurophysi-
ological states or events), and irreducibilty (they 
cannot be defined at the neurological level). 
 Beyond abstract mod-
els, particular relations of 
supervenience can be found 
and similarly described 
between many previously 
known levels of biological 
property organization with 
which we already have 
some scientific familiarity. 
Although neurologically 
specific examples might 
enlighten us to the ways 
we can locate and experi-
ence the otherwise abstract 
concept of supervenience 
in relevant biological sys-
tems, in these cases, just as in the functionalist 
model, such examples make room for higher level 
causation often due to the relational analysis of 
supervenience taking place between what are two 
already known-to-be causal levels of organization. 
In terms of the actual supervenience relation pre-
supposed by physicalist theory between mind and 
its neurological identity, we neither know what the 
describable systems fully responsible are for phe-
nomenal states, nor are phenomenal states them-
selves something that will likely ever be described 
in the same way we do a neurological system or 
biological level of organization. A supervenience 
relation between one level of objectively accessible 
properties and another level of objectively acces-
sible properties may do well at offering an instance 
of supervenience between two describable systems 
already known to be causal, but does little to sug-
gest that the subjective, phenomenal properties of 
conscious experience are necessarily causal, any 
more than the abstract example depicted (figure 1) 
demonstrates how they could very well not be. 
 Neuroethics involves these sorts of concerns 
when in its academic form it attempts to under-
stand how mental states and mental causation 
relate to the understanding of ourselves as willful 
moral agents and the psychological significance of 
our ‘mental’ lives. Even a complete ontological and 
causal account of the mind as a supervening aspect 
VOLUME 4 NUMBER 2 WINTER 2017 Journal of hospital ethics 49 
of the brain that exhausts all scientifically acquired 
knowledge of our neurologic apparatus, cannot 
account for what having a mind and a conscious 
experience is like for humans; that is, an account of 
the subjective phenomena of consciousness. What 
it is like to desire, to feel pain, to see green, to taste 
sweet, to hate, to wish, to love. This is not as much 
a charge against a physicalist account as it merely 
points to the irreducibly subjective character of 
experience.7 Physicalist theories of mind that ac-
cept (and expect) this irreducibility may continue 
to commit to a physical ontology, while for others, 
not having cognitive access to conscious experi-
ence across subjects for the purpose of scientific 
generalization presents a troublesome incongruity. 
This latter concern is a way of understanding the 
“hard problem” in the philosophy of mind.8
 Although some have offered empirical meth-
ods of obtaining useful information from introspec-
tive reports about subjective experience,9,10 the 
hard problem does not refer to one for neurosci-
ence to specifically overcome. The hard problem 
is a notion that intends to convey precisely the 
opposite: the intractable quality of capturing the 
nature of the subjective aspect of our phenomenal 
states, the properties of conscious experience, in 
physically reductive (scientific) terms. Perhaps 
the most telling feature of this intractability is 
that we insist on an inquiry that makes the object 
of scientific investigation the very thing by virtue 
of which we have the capacity to investigate, viz, 
consciousness. For some, this feature presents an 
unattainable objectivity, for others, a view of intro-
spection that posits the act as epistemically privi-
leged, returning us to the question of subjective 
reliability. These are only some of the derivative 
concerns of the irreducible subjectivity associated 
with the hard problem, and they are long-standing 
in the philosophy of science and the philosophy 
of mind. 
 Solutions to the hard problem are not antici-
pated in what neuroscience can yield. To think 
this is the case (as some who have attempted to 
characterize the problem as a defining feature of 
neuroethics) is to miss the point. This is not to 
say that neuroscience will fall short in its relevant 
work, but that it is simply not equipped to provide 
an explanation of subjective phenomena satisfac-
tory to its own empirical standards and therefore 
consistent with its own method. Even the kinds 
of explanations that could arise from a complete 
neuroscience addressing all functional and struc-
tural aspects of the brain will not likely explain 
the qualitative aspects of subjective conscious phe-
nomena. In my view, this extends to the qualitative 
aspects of our subjective sense of morality. 
 The phenomenology of consciousness is pre-
cisely where our moral lives take form, where the 
individual experiences moral agency. What it feels 
like to value something is indeed a supremely 
subjective thing. To feel in control of one’s moral 
decision making or to recognize the relationship of 
responsibility to one’s actions for some are inalien-
able features of our mental lives. Even our moral 
worth is most often understood as both an exter-
nal evaluation by way of the judgment of others 
in balance with the internal evaluation we make 
about ourselves because of what moral qualities 
feel like in our private, mental lives. The ontology 
and experience of having ‘moral knowledge’ is also 
tied to this notion. Taking on the stance of moral 
realism for illustrative purposes here, this can be 
articulated in the following way: Should there 
exist moral facts in the world about which I can 
come to have knowledge, how can the subjective 
conscious experience of having such knowledge 
ever be explained through a purely descriptive 
account? If subjective phenomenal consciousness 
is the realm in which our sense of moral agency 
resides (ie, moral language and concepts as refer-
ring to mental states and dispositions), then it 
seems clear why questioning its nature fails the 
test of clinical relevance.
 Even the most ‘philosophically grounded’ 
bioethics departments of the kind embedded in 
academic hospitals and that practice a solid and 
edifying dialectical process with healthcare pro-
viders and staff (I am privileged to work in asso-
ciation with one such program), neither in light of 
immediate ethical uncertainties or for the greater 
purpose of educating, find there to be any use 
in addressing such questions. This may point to 
precisely why, as a clinical ethics, neuroethics has 
comparably less legitimacy. However, this is not 
only due to a pragmatic collapse of its two-sided 
definition in a clinical context. What should also 
be considered is that philosophy of mind, a field 
whose standard set of influential inquiry is largely 
responsible for providing the moral questions of 
neuroethics a sufficiently distinct character, might 
obtain the problem of objectifying moral agency 
itself as a derivative symptom of the hard prob-
lem, ie, the inability to objectify mental states and 
the irreducibility of subjective, including moral, 
experience. 
 In short, academic neuroethics cannot lend its 
intended clinical counterpart its most fundamental 
morally relevant inquiry to any good use. In prac-
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The pursuit of understanding moral norms and practices
as rooted in our microphysical structure
occupies a significant portion of the 
core questions of neuroethics.
tice, clinical bioethics must admit the language 
of mental states and moral agency, including the 
acceptance of free will and mental causation at 
face value in a similar way to psychiatry; while 
what questions provide neuroethics a distinct 
character, make central the ontological and causal 
inquiry of those very states and concepts. This 
might be reason to believe that neuroethics can 
perhaps practically serve to identify a neurologic 
clinical case specialty, but what theoretical import 
can be argued to be sufficiently different from that 
best second order. Klein completed medical school 
and a PhD in philosophy at Georgetown Univer-
sity under the mentorship of Edmund Pellegrino. 
His article entitled “Who Invited the Clinical 
Neuroethicist?” explores the history and prag-
matic dimensions of the preceding consideration 
of clinical legitimacy, questioning even the notion 
of a neuroethics clinical specialty as perhaps too 
homogenous to standard clinical bioethics to be 
required or even recognized as a distinct practice 
in the hospital setting. His exploration of three 
of bioethics and thus legitimizing neuroethics 
as a justifiably distinct realm of moral inquiry is 
effectively impotent in helping establish it as a 
distinctive clinical ethics practice. 
JourNAl of HosPitAl EtHics: NeuroethiCs
In a way, this issue was an experiment with the 
following question in mind: Given the above argu-
ment, does neuroethics have a place at all in the 
clinical sphere? The answer is yes, but perhaps 
only when understood as a specialty. As the pres-
ence of bioethics emerges increasingly stronger in 
clinical and hospital organizations, functionally 
embedded and treated within many systems as 
simply another department, clinical ethics con-
sultants, like healthcare providers and other staff, 
also find themselves beginning to specialize. How 
distinct will the questions and concerns of the 
clinical neuroethicist be from those of the bioethi-
cist? Not very. However, this does not mean that 
practical and very direct benefits might not emerge 
from applying the specialized knowledge that 
comes from immersing as a clinical bioethicist in 
a particular medical subfield or department. This 
is the natural way; and it is already evident in the 
most sophisticated of hospital bioethics programs. 
 In constructing this issue, my relevant ex-
changes with Eran Klein revealed his position to 
be that a clinical neuroethics may inherit some of 
the legitimacy of its academic self, but this is at 
complex and telling clinical cases related to deci-
sional capacity is a timely and important one that 
delves directly into the question of whether or not 
a ‘clinical neuroethicist’ can be said to bring forth 
a special set of relevant expertise to the work of 
clinical ethics consultation. 
 The pursuit of understanding moral norms and 
practices as rooted in our microphysical structure 
occupies a significant portion of the core questions 
of neuroethics seen as an interdisciplinary field 
involving neuroscience, evolutionary biology, 
anthropology, psychology, and even the social and 
political sciences.11 Whether one philosophically 
recognizes the extent of the scientific inquiry as 
eventually limited in light of the hard problem as 
previously discussed, depends on whether one 
sees knowledge about moral experience as critical 
to the full epistemic picture. If, on the other hand, 
the goal is to obtain knowledge of what physical 
facts may underlie morally significant behavior, 
including decision-making processes, then one 
need not feel burdened by the irreducibility of 
subjective moral agency and may confidently move 
forward with the ‘science of morality’ in pursuit 
of a descriptive account. The danger here lies in 
the assumptive view of morality as reducible to 
particular types of behavior that can then be them-
selves causally reduced to physiology. What we 
need in these ever-increasing scientific accounts 
is the removal of the assumption and the replace-
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ment of it with a static definition of the kind of 
behavior being theoretically described as morally 
significant. Alternatively, as Chalmers suggests, if 
the pre-experimental goal is to attempt to ascribe 
consciousness to some neuroanatomical process, 
then the bridging principles involved (by which 
we make inferences from neurologic processing 
facts to facts about consciousness) should be made 
explicit in our reports.12 
 A look at how neuroscience continues to 
improve our understanding of such behaviors in 
relation to neurodegenerative disease and therefore 
directly informing the ethics of clinical practice 
was a perspective I felt ought to be included in 
this issue. When Sam Horng and I discussed the 
importance of including a static definition when 
making inferences about the “neuroanatomical 
substrates of moral behavior,” it took no convinc-
ing at all. Horng received his MD from Harvard 
Medical School and PhD in neuroscience at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Depart-
ment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences. Although 
he is a scientist first, the meta-ethical point was not 
lost here. Responsibly, Horng restricts his use of 
“impaired moral-decision making” to a definition 
of practical behaviors that potentially cause harm 
to others. In this way, he was able to construct an 
evidence-based practical framework for clinicians 
and hospital systems that suggests ways to better 
understand, predict, and manage the behavioral 
manifestations, including decisional impairments, 
of patients who suffer from neurodegenerative 
disease while addressing the problematic aspects 
of the behaviors themselves without claims about 
their ‘intrinsic moral nature.’ In an impressively 
broad but accessible review, Horng covers the cur-
rent data in relation to several common forms of 
relevant dementia and then builds his guidelines 
with a focus on education, detection and assess-
ment, treatment and resource referral, protection 
of others, and prevention of harm. 
 Finally, several different possible topics arose 
in conversation with Thomas Cochrane regarding 
his contribution to this issue. Cochrane is Direc-
tor of Neuroethics at the Center for Bioethics and 
Assistant Professor of Neurology at Harvard Medi-
cal School, although as a practicing neurologist, 
he spends a good deal of his time on the hospital 
floor doing the challenging work of neuro-intensive 
care. What he told me motivated him most was 
a 2006 study that revealed through a novel fMRI 
technique an increase in brain activity (elevated 
blood flow and inferentially, neuronal activity) in 
a young patient who was considered by definition 
of her disorder (vegetative state) to be unconscious, 
but was nevertheless asked to perform certain 
cognitive tasks. What is of significance here is that 
this activity was measured in the same regions of 
the brain that showed increased activity in healthy 
control subjects when asked to perform the same 
task, including regions associated with visual-
spatial processing. Cochrane covers many subse-
quent studies that have used various techniques to 
attempt to determine signs of clinical conscious-
ness in patients with disorders of consciousness 
by way of imaging (DOC-I), showing promising 
results. He argues that despite the popular notion 
that such techniques represent a “revolution in 
our understanding of consciousness” and there-
fore will have a significant impact on the ethics 
of decision making for patients with DOC, that 
this transfer of utility might be misguided, as the 
prognostic value of such techniques has yet to be 
scientifically established. 
 Despite a few high-profile cases that have 
shifted our perception of patients with DOC and 
the controversial protraction of life-sustaining 
therapies (LST) as typical, Cochrane notes that 
such disorders are common, and in most cases sur-
rogates and clinicians are quite clear on a course 
of action that would be in the patient’s overall best 
interest. When decision making about withdraw-
ing LST becomes uncertain, the relevant factors 
for surrogates are not often about the particular 
DOC diagnosis, but about prognosis, and in these 
cases it seems DOC-I does not provide us with 
added certainty. The question then becomes in 
what clinical scenarios will DOC-I be helpful to the 
decision-making process? That is, how do we make 
best use of an inference of consciousness through 
the fMRI studies mentioned? Cochrane attempts 
to answer this question for clinicians through an 
exploration of scenarios in which DOC-I would 
indeed be helpful, focusing largely on a carefully 
structured analysis of when the ethical complexi-
ties relate to possible signs of consciousness.
 As I mentioned in the beginning of this section, 
whether neuroethics can transfer its sufficiently 
distinct self from academia to the academic hospi-
tal and remain fully relevant is perhaps a question 
best answered by doing the work. The recognition 
of its most fundamental questions as perhaps 
limited in certain contexts by their philosophi-
cal nature is one possible conclusion, although 
its relevance and import in other areas should 
be explored through actual attempts to extend its 
reach, as our authors have done here, and see what 
happens. The experiment may very well take place 
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in the intellectual and practical work of testing 
its boundaries and subsequently refining its theo-
retical objectives. As good pragmatists, we should 
engage in these experiments with a hefty dose of 
fallibilism and adjust our explorations (and expec-
tations) accordingly.13 Waving the neuroethics flag 
(argumentum ad populum) or proclaiming against 
all reasonable circumscription that “neuroethics 
is here to stay” gets us nowhere. Providing excit-
ing avenues for professional development while 
upholding the promise of 21st century neurosci-
ence are questionable as the only reasons why 
neuroethics should persist in all forms. Indeed, it 
also reminds us that narrow attention and invest-
ment into the prospects of any single science (eg, 
genetics, evolutionary psychology) as that which 
will finally uncover the fundamental nature of 
‘morality’ might itself be conceptually misguided. 
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iNtroDuCtioN
Decision Making for Patients with Disorders of
Consciousness. 
Some disorders of consciousness (DOC) are asso-
ciated with an extremely poor perceived quality 
of life.1-4 When clinicians and surrogates care for 
patients with a prolonged DOC that could be per-
manent, they are often faced with having to make 
explicit decisions about life-sustaining therapies 
(LST). These situations pose a number of ethical 
difficulties: making decisions for someone who 
has lost capacity, decisions to withhold or with-
draw LST, and decision making under prognostic 
uncertainty. 
 These disorders are common, and the associ-
ated ethical difficulties are nothing new. Decisions 
about LST typically involve the substituted judg-
ment standard and what can be known about a 
patient’s values and preferences, given her current 
diagnosis and prognosis. When a surrogate and 
clinician agree that the patient would not want 
to continue LST, then clinicians are permitted 
to withdraw any LST, including tube feedings, 
ventilators, intravenous fluids, and medications. 
Notwithstanding a few contentious cases that have 
received intense public attention, this process of 
deciding whether to continue or discontinue LST 
in patients with DOC is usually quite uncontro-
versial.
 In what follows, I will use the term DOC to 
encompass coma, the vegetative state (VS), and the 
minimally conscious state (MCS). LST can refer to 
any life-sustaining therapy, but unless otherwise 
specified, the reader can infer the discussion to 
be about a patient whose LST consists only of 
artificial hydration and nutrition. Accordingly, 
when discussing withholding or withdrawing of 
LST, I will not be discussing patients diagnosed as 
brain-dead or locked-in. When referring to novel 
neuroimaging techniques to detect consciousness, 
I will use the term disorders-of-consciousness—
Imaging (DOC-I).
New radiographic techniques
In 2006, Owen and colleagues described a patient 
in VS with radiographic evidence that suggested 
some level of conscious awareness.5 She was 23 
years old, and underwent the study five months 
after experiencing a traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
from a motor vehicle accident. The studied in-
volved a novel fMRI technique whereby she was 
asked to imagine herself playing tennis, and then 
to imagine herself navigating through the rooms 
of her home. One would ordinarily not expect a 
vegetative patient to respond to verbal instructions, 
as patients in VS are by definition unconscious, 
but this patient was found to have increased blood 
flow (and by inference, neuronal activity) in the 
same brain regions that showed increased activ-
Neuroimaging and inferring consciousness: 
implications for life-sustaining therapies?
Thomas Cochrane, MD, MBA
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ity in healthy control subjects who were asked to 
perform the same task.5
 Some have suggested that inferring conscious-
ness from this type of study is problematic, because 
there is not yet an agreement about which types 
of neural activity are necessary and sufficient to 
support consciousness.6,7 However, most observ-
ers agree that the level of coordinated cerebral 
activity seen in this subject (and others like her) is 
high enough that we should infer from this some 
degree of consciousness.8 This is partly because 
(presently, at least) all of our judgments about the 
 Published literature contains little about 
whether subjects in VS or MCS who demonstrated 
greater-than-expected awareness were more likely 
to recover from these states. In 2014 Stender et al 
reported using fMRI and PET techniques on 41 
subjects in PVS and 81 subjects in MCS.12 The 
main finding of importance in this study was the 
following: 13 of 41 subjects in VS showed imag-
ing evidence suggesting awareness. Of these, five 
were TBI patients, five had ischemic injury, and 
three had other conditions (two had infection and 
one had subarachnoid hemorrhage).12 Research-
consciousness of others are based on inferences 
drawn from observations of behavior, and often 
with particular attention to the complexity of the 
behavior that is observed. In response to the verbal 
instruction regarding tennis imagery, the subject’s 
brain did what healthy brains do when planning 
motor activity. Moreover, in response to the ver-
bal instruction regarding navigation, the subject’s 
brain appeared to activate regions devoted to vi-
suospatial processing.
 In 2010, Monti et al studied 54 patients using 
techniques similar to Owen’s protocol. Of these, 
23 subjects were in VS and 31 in MCS. Out of five 
subjects who demonstrated greater-than-expected 
signs of awareness, four were in VS and one in 
MCS.9 Lastly, one of these could consistently an-
swer yes-no questions. 
 While this was an impressive demonstration of 
the power of DOC-I techniques to detect awareness, 
the results were not terribly surprising to clini-
cians. All of the responsive subjects had suffered 
a TBI—no subjects with ischemic brain injury 
showed DOC-I evidence of awareness. Four of the 
five were in their 20s, and the fifth was in his 40s. 
The study looked at three of these five participants 
within the first six months after their injury.9 Many 
patients in VS after TBI have a reasonably high 
likelihood of regaining consciousness within the 
first year after injury.10,11
ers saw the following outcomes among the 13 VS 
subjects who responded on DOC-I: three died due 
to complications of their illness; one remained in 
VS; six emerged into the MCS; two were severely 
disabled, and one had a good (full) recovery.12
 Was there a difference among these subjects 
when it came to the mechanism of injury (TBI, 
ischemic, or other)? It does not seem so, though the 
numbers are small. Among the five TBI patients, 
one did experience a good recovery 12 months after 
the study—a 58-year-old man who was initially 
evaluated one month and one week after his TBI. 
Another patient was slightly better than MCS, and 
so received a rating of “severe disability.” The 
remaining three were in MCS2 or dead.12 Among 
the five ischemic patients, the best recovery at 12 
months was to “severe disability.” The others were 
in MCS3 or dead.1 Among the patients with other 
conditions, one died, one was in VS, and one was 
in MCS.12
 The authors of this paper assert that PET “cor-
rectly predicted” outcomes in 74% of subjects, 
which turned out to have agreement between their 
PET at the time of study and their one-year clini-
cal outcome.12 However, the agreement in imaging 
studies between consciousness at the time of study 
and eventual outcome was only 56% when using 
fMRI. Note that fMRI only “predicted” the one-year 
outcome with the accuracy of a coin flip, and that 
Presently, at least, all of our judgments 
about the consciousness of others are based on
inferences drawn from observations of behavior.
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PET only did slightly better.12 In short, the prog-
nostic value of DOC-I is not yet established, and it 
may never be better than other clinical indicators.13
iMPLiCAtioNs For DeCisioN MAKiNG
It is often implied in the popular press that DOC-I 
findings represent a revolution in our understand-
ing of consciousness, and that DOC-I findings will 
have a major practical impact on decision making 
for all patients with DOC. Both claims are heav-
ily overstated, and only partly true. It is certainly 
humbling to learn that some patients who appear 
to be unconscious may not be. On the other hand, 
we know that clinicians’ ability to detect con-
sciousness at the bedside is less than ideal, so the 
idea that modern tools would improve our ability 
to detect consciousness is hardly a revolution.14,15 
The second claim—that DOC-I will have a major 
practical impact on decision making—has two 
problems. First, it is premature, because there 
has been so little research done on the prognostic 
value of DOC-I. Second, it is overly broad, because 
only some patients with DOC would find DOC-I 
“no” to LST in one, you would likely say “no” in 
the other. Based on my clinical experience (and for 
what it is worth, my related intuitions), for most 
people, the question that matters is not, “Precisely 
which severe DOC am I in?” but rather, “What are 
the odds that I will recover?” In addition, for most 
people the difference between VS and MCS is not 
important—most people find both unacceptably 
poor states in which to continue LST once it is 
reasonably certain that the condition will be per-
manent or significantly prolonged. On the other 
hand, for the minority who would want to continue 
LST in one state, it seems likely that they would 
want to continue LST in the other.
 When it comes to making decisions about LST, 
the most important question to answer is always, 
“What are the odds that the patient will recover 
to a state that he or she would find acceptable?” 
Since most of us would find permanent VS and 
permanent MCS equally unacceptable (or accept-
able), this question is a question of prognosis rather 
than diagnosis.
findings useful. In what follows, I will attempt to 
help the clinician by exploring the situations in 
which DOC-I would be useful, and those in which 
it would not.
When Prognosis is the issue—and it Very often is—
DoC-i is Not Likely to Be helpful
Would you want to continue LST if you were in a 
VS and extremely unlikely to recover? For argu-
ment’s sake, let us say all the experts agree that the 
odds are less than one in a hundred. Now imagine 
that you are in MCS, with exactly the same odds of 
recovery. Would you want to continue LST now? I 
would not try to guess your answers, but I do feel 
confident in making this prediction: if you said 
“yes” to LST in the VS, you would likely also say 
“yes” to LST in the MCS. Likewise, if you said 
When Detection of Consciousness is the issue—and 
it only occasionally is—DoC-i May Be helpful
Surely, one might think, making the most precise 
diagnosis possible would be essential before decid-
ing whether to continue LST. As I argued in the 
previous section, when deciding about LST what 
matters to most patients is not the precise diag-
nosis, but the prognosis. In these patients, DOC-I 
in its current stage of development is not particu-
larly helpful. There are, however, some patients 
for whom a precise diagnosis is a primary ethical 
consideration. Generally, the following types of 
patients may have a deep interest in making sure 
their diagnosis is clear.
•	 Patients	in	chronic	VS	who	would	continue	
LST in any case. Some patients would con-
sider even a permanently unconscious life to 
It is impossible to know what the subjective experience
of the MCS patient is, but there is good reason to believe
(or presume) that the MCS patient is capable of 
some physical or emotional suffering.
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be a life worth living. For these patients, the 
decision about whether to continue life sup-
port often does not depend on whether they 
are comatose, vegetative, minimally conscious, 
or in some other neurological state. 
 One might initially think that DOC-I would 
hold no particular importance in this con-
text, because the decision about continuing 
LST does not depend on the precise diagno-
sis. However, for these patients—who may 
live a long life in what looks at the bedside 
like VS—detecting consciousness may be of 
paramount importance in order to avoid the 
error of treating a conscious patient as if she 
is unconscious. This may have implications 
for simple bedside interactions with patients 
(talking to the patient, treating her gently and 
with respect) or it could have implications 
for the type of rehabilitation efforts that are 
attempted.16
•	 The	chronic	VS	patient	who	would	continue	
LST if there were evidence of awareness, but 
not otherwise. One could perhaps imagine a 
patient who would want to continue LST if he 
were in a permanent MCS, but not in VS. For 
such a patient, a “positive” fMRI study would 
mean the difference between continuing LST 
and not.
  Note, however, that this would be an un-
usual instance. It is impossible to know what 
the subjective experience of the MCS patient 
is, but there is good reason to believe (or pre-
sume) that the MCS patient is capable of some 
physical or emotional suffering. Subjectively, 
therefore, it seems likely that chronic MCS is 
a worse experience than chronic VS, because 
the VS patient is unconscious and incapable 
of experiencing suffering. This is why most 
people would consider both VS and MCS 
unacceptably poor neurological outcomes.
Patients for whom detection of consciousness is 
not the main issue would include the following.
•	 Patients	(in	MCS	or	better)	who	already	dem-
onstrate clinical evidence of awareness. The 
MCS patient, by definition, shows bedside 
evidence of awareness. For such a patient, 
one does not need DOC-I in order to avoid 
the mistake of treating a conscious patient as 
unconscious.
•	 Patients	in	acute	coma	or	VS	and	a	high	prob-
ability of recovering consciousness based on 
already-known prognostic factors. Patients 
who have recently suffered a traumatic brain 
injury, and who have no imaging evidence of 
major/widespread structural damage (such 
as hemorrhaging or other evidence of severe 
axonal injury) have a very high likelihood of 
recovering some consciousness, and some 
will have a good neurological outcome.11 Un-
less and until the prognostic value of DOC-I 
is established, DOC-I can have little role in 
decision making for a patient in this phase of 
care.
•	 Patients	with	little	to	no	chance	of	a	recovery	
they would consider meaningful. In some pa-
tients, it is already possible to prognosticate 
with a high degree of confidence that a recov-
ery the patient would consider sufficient will 
not occur. For instance, some patients with 
severe hypoxic-ischemic insult (eg, a large 
stroke or prolonged asphyxia) will demon-
strate widespread irreversible brain damage 
in MRI. For these patients, one might not be 
willing to predict whether the patient will re-
gain any consciousness, but could confidently 
predict that the patient will have severe cogni-
tive and functional limitations. For a patient 
whose decisions about LST will depend on 
cognitive or functional outcomes, the fact that 
they have a “positive” DOC-I study will not 
alter the prognosis or the decision about LST.
Patients with DoC in Long-term Care should have 
Diagnosis revisited Frequently
 It is well known that there is an uncomfortably 
high misdiagnosis rate for DOC—as high as 43%.16 
A large percentage of patients diagnosed as in VS, 
based on clinical consensus, when studied very 
carefully, are found to have behavioral responses 
to the environment—meaning that their real diag-
nosis is at least MCS, and possibly even higher.
 Sometimes a misdiagnosis of VS occurs be-
cause a patient’s brain injuries impair her mobil-
ity or language, thus preventing clinicians from 
detecting subtle behaviors that serve as evidence 
of improved awareness. Sometimes brain injuries 
impair sensation (vision, hearing, and relatedly, 
language comprehension), preventing the patient 
from perceiving an environmental stimulus that is 
meant to elicit a behavioral response. Sometimes, 
surely, a misdiagnosis occurs because of clinical 
confirmation bias—ie, clinicians who already 
believe a patient is unconscious are likely to inter-
pret subtle behaviors as reflexive, or coincidental, 
simply because that is what they expect to see. 
 The development of the JFK Coma Rating Scale-
Revised (CRS-R) represented an improvement over 
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clinical consensus diagnosis.17 This evaluation 
tool for patients with DOC is an important tool in 
systematically searching for behavioral evidence 
of awareness, and reducing the odds of missing 
that evidence when it exists.17
 However, DOC-I findings make the misdiagno-
sis concern even more serious. DOC-I reveals that 
even the CRS-R is not perfect at detecting aware-
ness when it exists. In fact, the study by Stender 
et al suggests the possibility of a persistent 32% 
misdiagnosis rate even using the CRS-R. 
Patients with Chronic DoC Must have the opportunity 
to Forego Lst, including oral hydration and Nutrition 
 Although it may seem counterintuitive, I argue 
that we should be more willing to let patients with 
chronic DOC forego LST. I reach this conclusion 
precisely because DOC-I research is eventually 
likely to further undermine our certainty about 
prognosis in the early stages of DOC. DOC-I find-
ings introduce further uncertainty about our ability 
to examine the brain at the bedside, which makes it 
even more important to be certain about prognosis 
before withdrawing or withholding LST. However, 
our current system of caring for patients with 
this “window of opportunity.”18 This sometimes 
happens in spite of serious prognostic uncertainty, 
which means that, inevitably, some patients who 
would have had an acceptable outcome will forego 
LST.
 As I have argued elsewhere, this fear of being 
stuck, and this perceived “opportunity to die,” 
exists mainly because of the difficulty in withdraw-
ing LST from a patient in a chronic DOC. If we were 
to make it easier to withdraw LST from a patient 
in chronic DOC whose prognosis is reasonably 
certain, then we might make it harder to withdraw 
in the acute phase when prognosis is uncertain. If 
we reduce that time pressure in the acute phase, 
we would be less likely to withdraw LST from a 
patient with a reasonable (or unknown) chance of 
an acceptable recovery.17
 The difficulty in withdrawing LST in the 
chronic phase is partly a practical reality, though 
it is one that we should change. For example, 
in some states there is little explicit support for 
withdrawing LST from patients in MCS from a 
legal perspective.19 This in turn makes some pro-
viders nervous about the legality of withdrawing 
LST in the MCS. However, this difficulty could be 
DOC puts pressure on surrogates and providers to 
withdraw LST in the first weeks after injury, when 
prognosis is extremely uncertain. Surrogates and 
providers caring for patients in the first days and 
weeks after brain injury fear that, if they accept 
LST in the acute/subacute phase of the injury, the 
patient might be “stuck” in a chronic and unac-
ceptably poor neurological state. As it is sometimes 
expressed, they fear missing the “opportunity to 
die” in the first days or weeks after their injury.18
 Approximately two weeks after an acute brain 
injury, the comatose/vegetative/minimally con-
scious patient will need to have his endotracheal 
tube replaced by a tracheostomy, and his nasogas-
tric or orogastric tube by something like a gastros-
tomy tube (G-tube). Providers and surrogates often 
feel that these procedures should not be performed, 
and the patient should be allowed to die during 
overcome by educating providers about the ethical 
and legal arguments that support patients’ right to 
refuse LST, or by amending applicable laws where 
necessary. Another barrier to withdrawing LST is 
the feeling experienced by clinicians that somehow 
they are acting in an ethically inappropriate way 
when withdrawing oral hydration and nutrition in 
the rare patient with DOC who is able to eat and 
drink by mouth. However, if the patient in VS or 
MCS has the right to withdraw LST, then one need 
not fear being “stuck,” and the time pressure that 
comes from fear of missing an “opportunity to die” 
will be relieved. Once the time pressure is relieved, 
patients can afford to wait and see whether they 
will recover to an acceptable state.
 As contradictory as it might seem, making 
sure that patients with chronic DOC can withdraw 
LST might well have the effect of saving lives of 
As it is sometimes expressed, patients fear missing 
the “opportunity to die” in the first days or weeks 
after their injury.
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patients with DOC. For this reason, we should try 
to ensure that patients with chronic DOC have the 
legal right to withdraw LST (eg, by clarifying laws 
that fail to support the right of the MCS patient to 
withdraw LST). In addition, ensure that the institu-
tions where patients with chronic DOC typically 
live (eg, nursing homes, rehabilitation hospitals) 
have policies and procedures that protect this right 
and ensure that LST can be withdrawn.
DisCussioN
Novel imaging techniques for detecting conscious-
ness are likely to alter practice when it comes to 
caring for patients with DOC, but the ways in 
which they will alter practice are still limited and 
unclear. Until DOC-I techniques can provide useful 
prognostic information about who will and will not 
recover consciousness, the clinical usefulness of 
such techniques will be very limited.
 At this point, DOC-I can only provide diagnos-
tic information, and no prognostic information that 
is reliable. As long as this remains the case, the 
implications of DOC-I for clinical care are limited. 
I believe the following are the major implications 
of the current state of the art:
1. Patients in the acute phase after injury (weeks 
to months) gain no useful additional informa-
tion from DOC-I unless and until the prognos-
tic value of DOC-I is established.
2. DOC-I might be helpful for patients in chronic 
VS who will continue LST whether or not 
they are conscious, because if such a patient 
were actually aware, then it would be a grave 
mistake to treat as unconscious.
3. It might rarely be deemed that a patient in 
chronic VS would continue LST if there were 
imaging evidence of awareness but would stop 
it otherwise. For such a patient, DOC-I might 
make the difference between continuing and 
discontinuing LST. 
4. For patients diagnosed as MCS or better based 
on the clinical exam, DOC-I has little or no 
utility, as these patients’ responsiveness can 
be detected at the bedside without DOC-I.
5. Patients whose prognosis can be established 
with a high degree of certainty are unlikely to 
benefit from DOC-I.
6. Because DOC-I findings further undermine the 
certainty with which we assess consciousness 
at the bedside, great care must be taken to ex-
amine and re-examine patients with chronic 
DOC.
7. Because DOC-I findings further undermine 
the confidence with which we prognosticate 
in the early phases of brain injury, we must 
take care not to make decisions under a false 
sense of time pressure. If prognosis is uncer-
tain (or completely unknown), then decisions 
about discontinuing LST should generally be 
postponed. 
8. In order to make waiting a viable strategy, we 
must ensure that patients who do not go on to 
have an acceptable recovery have the option 
to discontinue LST later on. For example, 
institutions and legal structures must support 
the right of the patient in MCS to forego LST 
once an unacceptably poor prognosis (from the 
patient’s perspective) is sufficiently certain.
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iNtroDuCtioN
Ronald Cranford proposed the term neuroethicist 
in 1989,1  more than a decade before the emergence 
of neuroethics as a distinct area of bioethics.2  He 
used the term to refer to clinical ethics consultants 
trained in diseases of the brain and spinal cord, 
principally neurologists like himself. The term 
gained little traction. Clinical ethics in the 1980s 
and 1990s was itself coming of age.3  The young 
field showed little interest in singling out individu-
als with narrow organ-specific expertise. As such, 
the term neuroethicist instead came to be associ-
ated with people engaged in ethical reflection on 
neuroscience research.4  More than 25 years later, 
a desire has arisen to set apart and affix a special 
name to the clinical ethicist who possesses brain-
related expertise. Before doing so, it is worth ask-
ing: Is the clinical neuroethicist necessary?
 The term clinical neuroethicist has had some-
thing of a circuitous birth.4 Neuroethics in general 
describes research into the nonscientific—ethical, 
legal, sociological, historical, theological—impli-
cations of neuroscientific advances. What should 
be done about incidental findings in neuro-imaging 
research? Is forensic lie detection a proper (or 
conceptually coherent) use of neurotechnology? 
Can a line be drawn between medical treatment 
and enhancement of mental life? Can neural cor-
relates of moral judgment be identified? These and 
related questions are now the subject of dedicated 
journals (Neuroethics, AJOB Neuroscience), neuro-
ethics centers and institutes (Stanford University, 
University of Pennsylvania, University of Oxford, 
University of British Columbia, and University 
of Montreal4), and a neuroethics society (Interna-
tional Neuroethics Society, or the INS5 ). In the for-
mative years of neuroethics, clinical issues largely 
resided at the periphery, important but perhaps 
too downstream from cutting-edge neuroscience 
research to warrant pressing concern.
 The rapid expansion of information and inter-
ventions in neuroscience have increasingly shown 
this view to be anachronistic. Prescription drugs 
that enhance academic performance are a problem 
for pediatricians now.6  The threat of depression 
and suicide from modulating deep brain stimulator 
(DBS) settings in Parkinson’s disease is a problem 
for neurologists now.7  Diagnostic uncertainty in 
disorders of consciousness raised by recent func-
tional imaging studies is a problem for families 
and critical care intensivists now.8  Developments 
in neuroscience and neurotechnology are rapidly 
converging on clinical care and along with this 
convergence arise dilemmas in clinical ethics. It is 
not surprising that expertise relevant to addressing 
such dilemmas is sought. Nor is it surprising that 
“clinical neuroethicist” has come to connote this 
desired expertise.
Who invited the clinical Neuroethicist? 
Eran Klein, MD, PhD
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 The term “clinical neuroethicist” is both 
catchy and broad. Clinical neuroethics problems 
are “neuro” in that they relate to the brain, “ethi-
cal” in that they raise moral questions and require 
the use of moral concepts, and “clinical” in that 
healthcare professionals do or may conceivably 
encounter them in their care of patients. The term 
covers not only the emerging ethical challenges 
of applying neuroscientific advances to medicine 
but encompasses the scope of expertise originally 
envisioned by Cranford, such as care of patients 
with diagnoses of coma, amyotrophic lateral scle-
of 20 years that he will no longer be coming into 
work, and arranges a meeting with an estate attor-
ney to put his financial affairs in order. However, 
he also begins to behave in ways his family finds 
worrisome. He volunteers at a home for juvenile 
offenders, despite having no previous interest or 
experience. He takes up rock climbing, though he 
has never been much of an athlete. He adopts six 
new dogs from the local humane society, stating 
that he wants to “make amends with the animals 
of the world.” He informs his family that he will 
be traveling to a foreign country to participate in 
rosis (ALS), or stroke. While sometimes cleaved 
of its “clinical” modifier in medical contexts (eg, 
the journal Neurology Today has a recurring col-
umn entitled “Ask the neuroethicist”9 ), clinical 
neuroethics and its practitioners—clinical neuro-
ethicists—are emerging as terms of art.10 ,11  
 The emergence of clinical neuroethics may 
be understandable, but whether this is a useful 
development is a separate question. In this article, 
I begin to explore this further question through 
presentation of three hypothetical clinical ethics 
cases. I argue that the purported “need” for clini-
cal neuroethics often rests on a misunderstanding 
of the kind of expertise involved in clinical ethics 
consultation and, as such, reserving a place for the 
clinical neuroethicist may not be necessary. 
three hyPothetiCAL CLiNiCAL ethiCs CAses 
AND the BrAiN
Case 1
Van is a 51-year-old government economist diag-
nosed with invasive but non-metastatic pancre-
atic cancer. After a rapid but thorough diagnostic 
workup, his prognosis is found to be grim with 
limited therapeutic options. A rather serious and 
introverted person by nature, he initially takes 
the diagnosis in stride. He discusses his condition 
with his wife and parents, informs his employer 
an experimental treatment for pancreatic cancer for 
which his family, after painstaking research, can 
find little scientific evidence. He seems to express 
little concern that this treatment will exhaust the 
family’s resources and geographically separate 
him from his family. The change to Van has been 
so dramatic, claims his family, that they question 
his decision-making capacity and request that 
his physicians consider medical and psychiatric 
evaluation.
 The experience of disease can be transfor-
mative. It can lead to radical changes in beliefs, 
values, preferences, commitments, and so on. 
Sometimes these changes are so out of character 
as to raise concerns about decisional capacity, as 
in this case. It may be the case that Van has lost 
decision-making capacity, perhaps due to yet 
undiscovered metastatic or metabolic changes, or 
due to a psychological schism leading to beliefs 
and commitments that no longer hold together in 
a rational, coherent whole. On the other hand, it 
is possible that these changes do not ultimately 
impugn his rationality. His diagnosis may have 
sparked him to reconfigure his values and inter-
ests, to push forward, in what limited time he has 
left, down an unchartered, but explicable, path. 
In any case, his experience of illness has changed 
him in important ways. The appropriate clinical 
response to the changes noted in Van—deference 
The emergence of clinical neuroethics may be 
understandable, but whether this is a useful development
 is a separate question.
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or intervention—involves a recognition that the 
change in him is, at some level, a change in his 
brain.
Case 2
Shireen is a 54-year-old former bus driver with 
liver failure and associated fluctuating menta-
tion. She has gone back and forth during recent 
lucid intervals about whether she wants a liver 
transplant and the requisite monitoring and be-
havioral “policing” she feels this will invite. Her 
three adult children desperately want her put on 
the transplant list. She takes medications, though 
not always consistently, for comorbid conditions. 
To the consternation of her three children, as her 
mentation has deteriorated, so has her medica-
tion adherence. Effective medical management 
of her comorbidities is a prerequisite for being 
maintained on the transplant list. As her periods 
of confusion have become more frequent, her 
family members admit to tricking her into taking 
her daily medications. They want to preserve her 
opportunity for a liver transplant if she ultimately 
decides to pursue one.
 Decision-making capacity is a centerpiece of 
biomedical ethics. Does a patient possess the ca-
pacity to make a particular healthcare decision? 
Capacity determination is not always easy, but 
is typically a critical early step in a clinical eth-
ics evaluation. In starkest terms, an affirmative 
response ushers in considerations of respect for 
autonomy, while a negative response consider-
ations of beneficence. Pathological conditions of 
the nervous system, whether primary (eg, brain 
tumor, schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease) or 
secondary (eg, from toxic buildup of metabolites 
in the brain, as is likely in this case), commonly 
affect decision-making capacity. A patient with a 
poorly functioning nervous system is at significant 
risk of compromised decision making. In the case 
of Shireen, addressing ethical questions about 
her decision making must start with recognizing 
a potential problem in her brain. 
Case 3
Dominic is a 62-year-old former construction 
worker recently implanted with a deep brain 
stimulator (DBS) for Parkinson’s disease. Soon 
after implantation, his family notes a change in 
his personality. He is no longer the conservative, 
religious man they have always known, but has 
become outgoing and, at times, abrasive. He is 
overly flirtatious with women and shows little 
regard for the feelings of both family and strangers. 
His DBS neurologist offers to adjust his stimulation 
parameters in hopes of reversing these personality 
changes, though perhaps at a cost of worsening 
his Parkinson’s disease symptoms. He refuses, 
telling both the clinician and his family, “I like 
the way I am now. I feel like I am finally free to 
be the real me.” 
 DBS is a highly effective treatment for Par-
kinson’s disease. An increasingly recognized 
side-effect of DBS in a minority of patients is a 
change in personality. Patients have been noted 
to experience poor impulse control, aggression, 
laughter, hypersexuality, apathy, depression, sui-
cide, marital problems, occupational disinterest, 
and impaired sociomoral judgment.12  Changes in 
personality are at times so profound as to lead 
some in bioethics to question whether individuals 
have undergone a change in personal identity. In 
the case of Dominic, it is clear that addressing the 
“question of identity” starts with recognizing that 
DBS has led to changes in his brain.
 The three cases—all centered on facets of deci-
sional capacity—highlight that most ethical dilem-
mas arising in medicine can be viewed through 
the lens of changes in brain structure or function. 
Given this, it is reasonable to ask whether clini-
cians with expertise in brain structure or function 
are needed because they can bring a brain-centric 
expertise to clinical ethics consultation.
A PLACe settiNG For the CLiNiCAL NeuroethiCist
The question whether the clinical neuroethicist 
deserves a spot at the clinical ethics table only 
makes sense against a background understand-
ing of the purpose and practice of clinical ethics. 
Fletcher defines clinical ethics as “an interdisci-
plinary activity to identify, analyze, and resolve 
ethical problems that arise in the care of particular 
patients.”13  La Puma defines it as “the process of 
identifying, analyzing and resolving moral prob-
lems of a particular patient’s care.”14  And Jonsen 
et al define the goal of ethics consultation as “iden-
tifying, analyzing, and working to resolve ethical 
problems encountered in individual cases.”15  Set 
against this understanding of clinical ethics, a 
clinical neuroethicist must both fit into this profes-
sional framework but also add some nonredundant 
value to clinical ethics. Is that the case?
 The cases highlight the sense in which many, 
if not most, clinical ethics cases involve the brain. 
Patients’ values and preferences, personalities, and 
decision-making capacities, emotions, and sense 
of self all intimately involve and depend upon 
the function of the brain. That being said, clinical 
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ethics hardly needs a specialist in the ethics of 
neurology or neuroscience to evaluate and work 
through such cases. Clinical ethics has gotten 
along for decades without a special class of experts 
called clinical neuroethicists. The principal reason 
for this is that the expertise that matters in most 
clinical ethics cases, even cases that primarily 
involve pathology of the brain, is general ethical 
expertise. The ability to discern the morally ap-
propriate choice within a given set of practical 
circumstances is what Aristotle in Book 6 of the 
Nichomachean Ethics calls phronesis.16  While 
phronesis may depend on a working knowledge of 
the brain insofar as how it supports complex and 
varied forms of mental life, it does not depend on 
an organ-specific ethical expertise. 
 This should not be read as denying the im-
portance, particularly in certain cases, of special-
ized knowledge of neuroscience, neurology, or 
psychiatry. Relevant facts about neurological dis-
ease or brain function certainly frame normative 
questions, but they do not decide them. It is no 
mistake that the first “box” in the Jonsen et al eth-
hammer, everything looks like a nail. There may 
be important perspectives that are lost or devalued 
by affording epistemic or methodological priority 
to brain-centric viewpoints. While recognizing 
the special status of the brain in terms of moral 
agency, nevertheless, pragmatic concerns remain 
that a clinical neuroethics designation opens the 
door to a silo-ing of clinical ethics, perhaps invit-
ing hepato-ethicists, ophthalmo-ethicists, and the 
like. One imagines that this would create more 
problems for clinical ethics than it would solve. 
 Clinical ethics may not need clinical neuro-
ethicists, but one might still ask whether there 
are benefits to leaving the door open to them. 
There are two reason to think that it might be. 
First, by current accident of history, neurologists, 
psychiatrists, neuropsychologists, neurosurgeons, 
and similar clinicians currently find themselves 
wedged between traditional medical practice on 
one side and a rapid expansion in knowledge about 
brain function and pathology on the other. This 
positions them as de facto translators of neurosci-
ence to the clinical world, even if this does not 
ics consultation method is “medical indications.” 
The descriptive facts of a case make certain ethical 
questions relevant and others less so. It may be 
crucial to know, for instance, whether and in what 
ways Dominic’s personality has changed since 
receiving the DBS, but even with such knowledge 
further normative questions remain. What do these 
changes mean for Dominic or his family? Are they 
good? What is the appropriate role of the clinician 
in persuading or intervening? Addressing these 
kinds of questions is well within the domain of 
clinical ethics.
 There would seem good reasons to resist carv-
ing out a special place for clinical neuroethics. I 
have argued elsewhere that skepticism of clinical 
neuroethics, at least in its uncritical and overly 
ambitious forms, is warranted.17  For one, filtering 
all clinical ethics problems first through a neu-
rological lens can be distorting; to the proverbial 
confer special ethical expertise. Calling some sub-
set of these individuals “clinical neuroethicists” 
might have pragmatic value. The second reason to 
leave the door open is that it is not clear yet how 
developments in neuroscience may change the 
practice and organization of medicine. The future 
of medicine, for instance, might one day include 
a medical specialty specifically focused on how 
changes in brain structure and function influence 
patients’ values and preferences. One can imagine 
that specialists in such an area might develop, over 
time, not just technical expertise, but some limited 
degree of ethical expertise. Whether medicine 
would, or should, ever move in that direction is 
unclear, but if it did, reserving the term “clinical 
neuroethicist” could be useful.
 Whether it is unnecessary or just premature 
to welcome the clinical neuroethicist is unclear. 
Cranford’s proposal for a new kind of clinical 
There may be important perspectives that are lost 
or devalued by affording epistemic or methodological priority
 to brain-centric viewpoints.
64 Journal of hospital ethics WINTER 2017 VOLUME 4 NUMBER 2 
ethicist —the neuroethicist—should garner no 
warmer a reception now, on the other side of the 
birth of neuroethics, than it did nearly three de-
cades ago. For now, clinical ethics does not need 
a special class of brain-centric ethicists. That said, 
the neuroscience revolution is only just beginning, 
and its effects on the practice of medicine are only 
beginning to come into view. It may be wise to 
leave a seat open just in case.
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Over the last two decades, the field of human social 
neuroscience has accelerated our understanding 
of the neuroanatomical substrates of decision 
making, particularly in domains of moral behav-
ior.1-3 Behavioral neurology, in turn, has advanced 
its characterization of specific decision-making 
impairments in various neurodegenerative dis-
eases.4,5 These conditions provide the opportunity 
to learn how a loss of function or dysregulation of 
previously normal pathways may influence many 
behaviors of moral significance. A rapidly aging 
population and the growing recognition of these 
cognitive impairments6 require a practical and 
ethical framework for clinicians, including inter-
nists, geriatricians, neurologists, and psychiatrists. 
 In this paper, I provide a working framework 
for the clinician confronting impairments in moral 
decision making in patients with neurodegenera-
tive disease. I will start by defining my terms and 
outlining the scope of my discussion. I will then 
discuss the bioethical principles at stake in sce-
narios of moral decision-making impairment and 
provide a broad but succinct review of the current 
data describing distinctive moral decision-making 
deficits in the most common and relevant forms 
of dementia: behavioral variant frontotemporal 
dementia (bvFTD), Alzheimer’s disease (AD), 
Parkinson’s disease (PD), and Huntington’s disease 
(HD). Finally, I will proffer guidelines on ethical 
considerations for clinicians caring for such pa-
tients, focusing on the following issues: education, 
detection and assessment, treatment and resource 
referral, and finally protection of others and pre-
vention of harm. 
 I will restrict my use of the term impaired 
moral decision making to practical behaviors that 
potentially cause harm to others. These behaviors 
carry the widest consensus for moral concern 
and are the most pertinent in their outcomes to 
everyday interactions with clinicians, caregivers, 
loved ones, and strangers.2 This restricted range of 
behaviors, nonetheless, involves a diversity and 
heterogeneity of neural pathways, differentially 
affected in different neurodegenerative condi-
tions.7,4 I will also limit my discussion to the effects 
of neurodegenerative disease, although impaired 
moral decision making, as defined above, is pres-
ent in other psychiatric and neurodevelopmental 
disorders. 
 As our understanding of moral decision mak-
ing continues to advance, this framework will 
guide clinicians in the context of a rapidly evolving 
field. Integrating basic discoveries on the cognitive 
mechanisms of moral decision making with clini-
cal studies that demonstrate selective impairments 
in practical moral tasks should ideally result in 
compassionate and preventative strategies against 
harmful behaviors by patients, and is a dynamic 
and challenging frontier in neuroethics.8
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MorAL DeCisioN MAKiNG AND DeMeNtiA: 
DeFiNitioNs AND sCoPe
A biological basis for moral decision making 
has been argued by philosophers and supported 
empirically by cognitive neuroscientists, neurolo-
gists, and psychiatrists alike.9-15 Within the clinical 
neurosciences, however, morality is defined as a 
collection of values that guide social behaviors, 
and it is assumed to be normative, or universal.16-18 
Neural networks are hypothesized to drive cogni-
tive and affective strategies that promote various 
moral dispositions and manifest as practical prin-
strategic approach for the clinician in preventing 
these behaviors.
resPeCt For AutoNoMy iN the settiNG oF 
ChANGiNG VALues AND BehAViors 
Much of the previous bioethics literature on 
neurodegenerative disease has focused on ethical 
conflicts related to decision making for medical 
treatments, participation in clinical research, 
and more recently, financial management risk, 
particularly when the perceived wishes of the 
demented patient appear to diverge from those 
expressed when previously healthy.33-38 Ethical 
ciples, including the avoidance of harm, fairness, 
community, authority, and purity.18 From an evo-
lutionary perspective, these pathways may have 
evolved to optimize parent-offspring bonds as well 
as the fitness of individuals living in communities 
and social hierarchies.19-21 
 Whatever the neuro-anatomical substrates of 
moral decision making might be, what we can say 
is that they do not represent a monolithic process. 
Multiple parallel and hierarchical neural networks 
engage in a variety of subprocesses that theoreti-
cally contribute to what we recognize as moral de-
liberation and behavior.22,23,13 Conceptual aspects 
of moral decision making that are most heavily 
emphasized and investigated in the literature in-
clude emotional processing, empathy, and theory 
of mind (ToM), that is, the ability to understand 
and interpret another’s beliefs, emotions, and be-
haviors.24-26 Abnormalities in emotional process-
ing, empathy, and ToM are most notably described 
in autism spectrum disorders, Williams syndrome, 
schizophrenia, and antisocial personality disor-
der.27-32 Neurodegenerative diseases have well-de-
fined neuro-anatomical substrates,5 and generally 
seem to affect narrower and more specific aspects 
of moral decision making. Furthermore, they occur 
in individuals who previously exercised normal 
function, and subsequent loss of these faculties is 
incremental. Therefore, anticipatory planning is a 
analysis in these contexts often grapples with the 
well-established bioethical principle of respect 
for autonomy.39-41,33,42,36 In settings where loss of 
cognitive capabilities alters or degrades the abil-
ity to formulate values and pursue them without 
assistance, one must first determine whether 
there are values still espoused and, if so, whether 
to accord the patient the same decision-making 
autonomy as before. 
 Two different types of values were identified 
by Dworkin to inform whether someone possesses 
a “capacity for autonomy”: the first are “experien-
tial interests,” which represent a state of mind, or 
how an experience feels; the second are “critical 
interests,” which represent a more reflective and 
integrative set of values, and are deemed to be good 
in a more abstract sense, even if they sometimes 
provide for unpleasant experiences.39 
 Jaworska argues that demented patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease often still possess critical in-
terests, which may be identifiable in conversation 
or meaningful behavioral interactions during what 
she calls “the twilight of agency.”33 These residual 
interests, though likely to be limited or less com-
plicated than those earlier in life, are still worthy 
of respect and facilitation, and may even demand 
precedence over those previously held.
 Impairments in moral decision making raise 
additional ethical considerations regarding au-
A biological basis for moral decision making
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tonomy. To what extent do changes in moral 
behaviors in dementia reflect changes in critical 
interests, or, more broadly, the personal identity 
of a patient? Interviews with family members of 
dementia patients reveal that changes in charac-
ter traits associated with moral decision making, 
such as generosity, honesty, and loyalty, were 
more strongly associated with perceived changes 
in identity than changes in other features, such as 
curiosity, creativity, intelligence, and humor.43 
 As will be explored below, some degenerative 
conditions do seem to alter critical interests, such 
as in cases of apathy and loss of empathy noted in 
bvFTD.44,45 In other conditions, such as PD treated 
with dopamine agonists, it seems more likely that 
the same critical interests persist, but that cogni-
tive impairments in risk assessment and impulse 
control alter aspects of moral decision making, 
which may lead to harmful outcomes that under-
mine otherwise unchanged interests.46
 Finally, what restrictions should be placed on 
the patient in moral consideration for potential 
victims? Range of harm may vary across a spec-
trum, from physical assault by an agitated AD 
patient, and petty theft in bvFTD, to homicidal 
ideation and planning in HD.47 The specific clini-
cal strategy employed is likely to depend on the 
specific neurodegenerative disorder and stage 
of disease, the deficit in moral decision making, 
and the individual patient. Though the approach 
would be highly case dependent, the psychiatric 
ethics literature offers guidance in negotiating the 
conflict between respect for autonomy, the right 
to privacy in healthcare, and the safety of poten-
tial victims.48-50 Typically, protection of potential 
victims is prioritized over the patient’s autonomy, 
though in accordance with the bioethical principle 
of nonmaleficence, preventative strategies protect-
ing potential victims must also carefully consider 
potential harms to the patient.51,42,50
 A retrospective medical record review revealed 
that 37% of bvFTD and 20% of HD patients devel-
oped a history of criminal behavior during their 
illness, while the rate for AD patients was much 
lower at 7.7%.52 There currently exist no legal 
statutes requiring clinicians to monitor or report 
moral decision-making deficits in dementia to law 
enforcement agencies. Unlike the public safety 
hazard posed by potential automobile drivers 
with epilepsy, which has led to mandatory legal 
reporting requirements in a handful of states 
in the United States,53,54 the causal relationship 
between impairments of moral decision making 
and criminal behavior are not known. As the ag-
ing population grows, and more empirical data 
become available on predictive factors for criminal 
behavior in these groups, developing consensus 
guidelines among behavioral neurologists for the 
elective reporting of a dementia patient’s poten-
tially harmful behavioral tendencies may be war-
ranted to optimize public safety.
MorAL resPoNsiBiLity iN DeMeNtiA
The potential for criminal behavior raises the 
broader question of whether patients with demen-
tia should be held responsible for harms resulting 
from behavioral extensions of their disease. Debate 
continues among philosophers and cognitive neu-
roscientists on the existence, extent, and operation 
of free will, even in healthy individuals.55-60 Since 
such arguments carry implications for moral re-
sponsibility in the context of both moral theory and 
criminal justice, and will not be addressed within 
the scope of the present discussion. 
 Nonetheless, for the clinician, it is helpful to 
consider the legal standards of criminal responsi-
bility, which include three required conditions: 
1. The act is deemed voluntary or intentional 
2. The person possesses a mental state in which 
awareness of harm or of risk of harm is present, 
termed mens rea 
3. The person demonstrates an “appreciation” 
that the “nature and quality” of the act is harmful, 
as used in the so-called “insanity” defense by the 
U.S. federal M’Naughton rule.61,62,60 
 Defining and ascribing these features to 
patients in a given situation is complex, case-
dependent, and certainly beyond my scope here. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that this determination 
can and should be empirically driven to the best 
extent possible, though available data are often 
incomplete. Yaffe argues that cognitive neuroscien-
tists and criminal psychologists must collaborate, 
moving forward, to design empirical studies that 
yield relevant data on these three conditions in 
relation to neurodegenerative disease.60 
 In so far as dementia represents a pathogenic 
process modulating decision-making pathways in 
a degenerative or progressive fashion, it may be 
practically assumed for the clinician’s purposes 
that this process is beyond the patient’s control. 
The acting patient, even if attempting to modulate 
aberrant decision-making pathways in line with 
pre-existing critical interests, likely exercises 
less control over these harmful acts. Therefore, a 
preventive (rather than punitive or remediative) 
strategy is likely to prove more clinically efficient 
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and compassionate in our attempts to minimize 
harm from these behaviors. 
eMPiriCAL DAtA oN MorAL DeCisioN-MAKiNG 
iMPAirMeNts iN DeMeNtiA
Case studies have described harmful behaviors 
arising during the course of various neurodegen-
erative diseases.47 A growing body of studies has 
further characterized deficits in cognitive tasks 
of moral relevance, including those measuring 
emotion recognition, ToM, and impulsivity.7,46,63,64 
Deficits in the performance of established decision-
making paradigms that have been designed to 
weigh unknown and known risks against monetary 
benefits have also been investigated, and these 
changes may contribute in additional ways to 
moral behavior.5
Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia
FTD encompasses a group of dementias that are 
defined by common pathologic features underlying 
temporal and frontal cortical degeneration.65,66 Be-
havioral variant FTD leads, at its core phenotype, 
to the transgression of social norms.67 Patients 
exhibit a seeming loss of empathy, insight, and 
impulse control, and criminal behaviors in this 
population may include theft, physical aggres-
sion, violence, public urination, and inappro-
priate sexual advances.68,69,52 Early degeneration 
of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
occurs and has been behaviorally correlated to 
emotionally absent and purely logical responses 
to moral dilemmas.70 Deficits in ToM tasks, includ-
ing first-order false belief and faux pas tests, are 
more frequently impaired in bvFTD compared to 
AD patients, and these impairments correlate to 
decreases in VMPFC volume.7 Decreased empathy 
is associated with atrophy of the right orbitofron-
tal/ventrolateral (OFC/VL) cortex and anterior 
temporal areas.24 Finally, bvFTD patients exhibit 
impairment in decision making under conditions 
of unknown risk, as assessed by the Iowa Gam-
bling Task, a test in which subjects select cards 
of monetary value from four piles, two of which 
have predominantly low value cards.71 This deficit 
does not correlate with ToM performance, suggest-
ing that independent deficits occur in separate 
decision-making pathways.
Alzheimer’s Dementia
Alzheimer’s dementia is characterized by degen-
eration of the basal forebrain, causing decreased 
acetylcholinergic input into the lateral temporal, 
frontal, and parietal cortices, leading to progressive 
deficits in memory, language, visuospatial skills, 
and executive functioning.72 Early involvement of 
the medial temporal lobes, particularly the hippo-
campus and entorhinal cortex, mediates impair-
ments in memory encoding. Deficits in social be-
havior stem largely from complications of memory 
loss, which include disorientation to place and to 
other persons, which may lead to agitation and 
possibly aggressive behaviors.46 ToM and empathy 
are largely spared, particularly in comparison to 
bvFTD patients.7 Deficits in the Iowa Gambling 
Task in AD reveal a lack of strategic thinking, with-
out apparent increases in risky behavior consistent 
with the inability to learn or apply probabilities of 
risk to decision-making strategy.5
Parkinson’s Disease
Idiopathic PD involves the degeneration of do-
paminergic projections from the substantia nigra 
(midbrain) to the dorsal striatum (basal ganglia), 
causing motor abnormalities, such as tremor, rigid-
ity, and bradykinesia.73 Mesostriatal (dorsal) and 
mesolimbic (ventral) projections modulate activity 
in the dorsolateral and orbitofrontal prefrontal cor-
tices, respectively; dopaminergic tone and bursts 
into this system are believed to mediate reward 
signaling for corresponding motor and cognitive 
tasks.74-76 PD patients on dopamine agonists have 
been noted to exhibit pathologic gambling, hyper-
sexuality, pathologic eating, compulsive shopping, 
and kleptomania.77 An “overdose theory” proposes 
that exogenous dopamine agonist affects both the 
pathologic dorsal and intact ventral mesostriatal 
pathways, leading to overstimulation of cogni-
tive/emotional decision-making pathways and 
potentially promoting novelty seeking and impulse 
dysregulated behaviors.78 This process may also 
account for deficits in weighing gains and losses, 
set shifting, and decision making under unknown 
risk, as assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task.5 
Finally, emerging work has identified progressive 
deficits in ToM tasks in PD patients, particularly 
faux pas and emotional recognition tests.64 The 
anatomical substrates of these deficits are unclear.
huntington’s Disease
Huntington’s disease is caused by a CAG-repeat 
expansion mutation in the Huntington gene, which 
causes progressive medium spinal neuron degen-
eration in the striatum and manifests clinically 
by choreiform movement abnormalities, cognitive 
deficits, and psychiatric disturbances, most com-
monly depression, and changes in personality.79 
Neurodegeneration progresses in a stereotyped, 
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topographic manner, involving dorsal to ven-
tral, anterior to posterior, and medial to lateral 
striatum, and thereby corresponding to sequential 
involvement of the dorsolateral to orbitofrontal 
cortices.80 Studies demonstrate deficits of ToM, 
as well as facial and vocal emotion recognition in 
HD patients, particularly with negative emotions, 
including anger, disgust, and fear.63 Deficits in the 
Iowa Gambling Task, accompanied by absence 
of autonomic skin conductance changes during 
losses, points to an aberrant negative feedback 
response.81 HD patients have been reported to 
demonstrate violent outbursts, homicidal plan-
ning, and a schizophrenia-like psychosis has been 
reported in 6-25% of patients.82
 In summary, neural circuits affecting moral 
behaviors in dementia include: frontal cortical 
areas affecting intuitive and emotional responses 
(right VMPFC) and empathy and perspective-tak-
ing (OFC/VL, anterior temporal cortex) in bvFTD; 
medial temporal, frontal; and parietal cortices 
subserving spatial and social memory and orienta-
tion in AD; ventral mesolimbic-cortical pathways 
mediating reward feedback and impulse control 
independence, and resource referral. Additional 
considerations unique to moral decision-making 
impairments involve the protection of others and 
prevention of harm.
education
Educating patients, families, and caregivers about 
the potential for harmful behaviors and the typical 
deficits associated with neurodegenerative disease 
can provide reassurance and, importantly, encour-
age preventive measures throughout the course 
of illness. From the patient’s perspective, early 
education provides the opportunity to establish a 
healthcare proxy and express one’s own preferred 
management of potential harmful behaviors. Ex-
plicit statements of current values and critical 
interests may by useful. For family and caregiv-
ers, recognizing that apparent changes in identity 
may be due to pathologically mediated deficits 
in particular tasks (such as emotional processing 
and perspective taking, visuospatial and social 
memory, or the assessment of risk) may demystify 
these behaviors and attenuate offense or harm. 
Environmental strategies to minimize the opportu-
nity for such decision making can be pro-actively 
in PD; and striatal-prefrontal cortical networks 
mediating emotional recognition and ToM in HD. 
A PrACtiCAL FrAMeWorK For CLiNiCiANs
Clinicians caring for a patient with neurodegen-
erative disease must anticipate that the patient 
is at risk for decision-making behaviors with the 
potential to cause harm to others, including family, 
caregivers, medical personnel, and strangers in the 
community. I propose the following framework to 
address the ethical responsibilities clinicians face 
in such cases. The first few features are adapted 
and extended from a framework provided by 
Marson in the management of financial capacity 
in dementia, as many of the same considerations 
apply, particularly with regard to autonomy.38 
These areas are education, detection and assess-
ment of impairment, strategies to treat and support 
explored, such as enforcing explicit social rules 
with bvFTD patients, providing orienting stimuli 
to AD patients, or avoiding risk-laden options for 
PD patients. 
 
Detection and Assessment
The clinician may assist in the early detection of 
moral decision-making impairments with the use 
of screening questions focused on common behav-
ioral deficits described in the different dementias. 
Early warning signs may include apathy, impulse 
dysregulation, agitation, and social withdrawal. 
An assessment of early behavioral markers may 
be helpful. While cognitive studies have identified 
certain early deficits, such as with the Iowa Gaming 
Task in PD or negative emotional recognition tasks 
in HD, clinical tools to sensitively identify specific 
moral decision making impairments in dementia 
The potential for criminal behavior raises the
 broader question of whether patients with dementia 
should be held responsible for harms resulting from 
behavioral extensions of their disease.
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have not yet been standardized. Further research 
will help to identify and clinically validate more 
sensitive cognitive assessment tools. Professional 
consensus guidelines may be helpful in developing 
more effective and efficient screening algorithms 
for this purpose. Recognizing specific impair-
ments, as discussed previously, can help tailor the 
approach, particularly with regard to protecting 
others and preventing harm. 
treating and supporting independence 
and resource referral
Strategies to support independence while mini-
mizing harm to others will be informed by the 
specific deficits at hand. These may include 
training caregivers in the social reinforcement of 
rules and expectations, simplifying the residential 
environment, restricting access to finances, and, 
in some carefully considered cases, pharmacologic 
treatment. These efforts will benefit from interdis-
ciplinary collaborations among family, caretakers, 
and clinical specialists. Referral to a behavioral 
neurologist or geriatric psychiatrist may be useful 
for more complex diagnostic and pharmacologic 
management questions. Involvement of a lawyer 
or adult protective services may be warranted to 
establish conservatorship if the patient requires a 
proxy to prevent persistent behaviors endangering 
his or her own legal interests. 
Protecting others and Preventing harm
Finally, clinicians have an ethical stake in the 
protection of potential victims and the prevention 
of harmful behaviors. As noted above, informing 
caregivers and family of the potential for these 
behaviors heightens awareness, encourages the 
development of preventive strategies, and likely 
minimizes harm. In this context, there are no man-
datory legal requirements to report the potential 
for harmful behaviors. In cases of high risk for 
such behavior, professional consensus guidelines 
to specify monitoring paradigms and conditions 
for elective reporting to the state would be help-
ful. Beyond the aforementioned strategies of social 
reinforcement, environmental alterations, financial 
restriction, and pharmacologic treatment, patients 
may additionally require supervisory measures 
and restricted access to places or certain individu-
als to protect those at risk for harm.
CoNCLusioN
The purpose of this paper was to review our 
present understanding of how neurodegenera-
tive processes can lead to harmful behaviors, to 
discuss the morally relevant implications of these 
behaviors, and to provide practical guidelines on 
the clinician’s role and ethical obligations in this 
context. As we continue to learn more about the 
neural mechanisms contributing to moral deci-
sion making and the specific impairments caused 
by neurodegenerative diseases, clinicians will be 
faced with new opportunities to translate these 
insights into safer and more compassionate plans 
of care. 
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in PrActice
learning to talk to surrogates about shifting to
comfort Measures only in a Neurologically 
Devastated Patient
Richard T. Benson, MD, PhD, and the Editorial Group of 
the John J. Lynch MD Center for Ethics
An 87-year-old woman, Ms. T, was helicoptered 
into your hospital’s Neurologic Intensive Care Unit 
(NeuroICU) a week ago from a small community 
hospital in a rural part of the state. The patient has 
suffered a devastating left internal carotid artery 
territory infarction with hemorrhagic transforma-
tion, midline shift and herniation. The destruction 
is so severe that her clinical neurologic evaluation 
is negative for any cortical brain function, and she 
is not anticipated to recover neurologically. The 
patient’s past medical history includes a coronary 
artery bypass surgery (CABG) six years ago with 
worsening congestive heart failure (CHF) in the last 
year, diabetes, and a chronic yet stable creatinine 
of 2.6. At baseline, the patient was reported to have 
moderate dementia but was still ambulatory with 
assistance at home, which has been provided by 
her eldest daughter and son-in-law.
 On rounds during the last several mornings, 
after the necessary medical presentation, the at-
tending physician has shifted the substance of 
the conversation to the “big picture.” That is, this 
patient is now medically and hemodynamically 
stable, despite being intubated and off sedation. 
The family continues to insist that everything be 
done. However, none of the professionals want 
to trach and peg this patient, knowing that the 
facilities to which this patient could safely be 
discharged are only going to return her to the 
hospital in worse shape than she is now. The 
family reluctantly agreed that the patient should 
not be resuscitated if she were to have a cardiac 
arrest and so a do-not-resuscitate order (DNR) has 
been entered into the patient’s electronic medical 
record (EMR). This limitation to the potential use 
of “life-extending” technology was a significant 
negotiation in and of itself and only came after 
several days without any improvement in the 
patient’s condition. 
 For the past day or two, however, as the team 
has begun working towards setting up another 
conversation about goals of care, the family has 
been saying that they see her getting better and 
want to give her more time. The medical team, 
meanwhile, does not see their patient getting any 
better; the team does not see her changed in any 
way from when she arrived. Some of the nurses 
and physicians have understood the discrepancy 
from a psychological perspective. That is, many of 
the medical team have been attributing the family’s 
insistence that Ms. T is improving to a collectively 
sustained state of denial. 
 Denial is a powerful psychological concept, 
understood as a mental state that acts as a defense 
mechanism when an individual is faced with a set 
of facts so uncomfortable and anxiety provoking 
that he or she simply does not believe they can 
be true, even when there may be overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. Here, the overwhelming 
evidence points to the irreversibility and gravity 
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of the brain insult. Nevertheless, family members 
are focused on reporting that she is squeezing their 
hands, moving her feet, and puckering her lips 
when they speak into her ear or kiss her on the 
cheek.
 Because many on the team think the family 
is in denial, the nurses and residents have been 
trying to refute what the family is saying. Some 
team members have expressed that if the patient 
is moving or seeming to respond, these are sim-
ply residual, reflexive, neurological impulses; an 
explanation the family has found to be dismis-
sive. Some of the team have even suggested to the 
daughter that Ms. T is suffering and that the family 
should be shifting to comfort care. These incon-
sistent and confusing comments have produced 
resistance in the family, who have only become 
more entrenched in their determined belief that 
Ms. T can get better.
 Today on rounds there is a new attending 
physician. She is not only the new attending for 
the current week, but she is also the new unit 
chief, and so everyone who could attend rounds 
has done so. After a resident presents and reviews 
Ms. T’s conditions and explains the problem of the 
reasonable balance in her disposition, responded 
that physiologically the intern was not so far off. 
Although, clearly, using that sort of imagery with 
the family would be less than appropriate. This 
family is in crisis, and the team is going to have 
to be particularly careful not to say anything that 
could be considered insensitive. 
 “But,” she says with another amused smile, 
“following that scientific line of thinking, “who 
knows something about newborn rooting and grasp 
reflexes?” 
 A resident who has recently had her first child 
speaks up, describing what these are. “The rooting 
reflex,” she explains, “is a motor response triggered 
when the corner of the baby’s mouth is touched. 
The baby puckers its lips and turns in the direction 
of the touch, which helps the baby begin feeding. 
This reflex disappears at about 4 months of age. As 
for the grasp reflex, this is when stroking the palm 
of a newborn causes the baby to close his or her 
fingers in a grasp. This reflex disappears at about 
5 to 6 months of age.” 
 The chief picks up the discussion, posing to 
the group that this patient may well be displaying 
these type of reflexes, which can appear after a 
family’s unrealistic demands in terms of denial, 
the new chief asks why the team members think 
this to be the case. Another resident responds that 
during his examinations he has not seen a change 
since the patient arrived. She will occasionally 
move her foot or open one eye, but she is essen-
tially unchanged since she’s been in the unit. The 
patient’s nurse says that the family has become 
increasingly distrustful and refuses to listen to 
anyone who doesn’t understand these to be signs 
of improvement. 
 One of the interns contributes that he grew 
up on a farm and the situation reminds him of a 
chicken with its head cut off. Although his inten-
tion was to point to a comparable neurological 
phenomenon in a different organism, the com-
ment garnered a few laughs. The chief, striking a 
stroke. Rather than being in what we might assume 
is a state of denial, the family may genuinely per-
ceive these reflexes as meaningful behavior. The 
chief also notes for the record that when the nurses 
and physicians tell the family, “it’s just reflexes,” 
the family feels they have been disrespected. With-
out explaining or taking the time to educate them 
about what reflexes they may be eliciting from the 
patient, it’s easy to see why the family might feel 
that their concerns are being ignored or devalued. 
 The chief lets the implications of this informa-
tion sink in. A few seconds into the silence, one 
of the medical students ventures, “So we’re sort 
of wrong here, right? We’re attributing what the 
family is saying to denial, a psychological defense 
mechanism, when they really may be seeing physi-
cal movement in the form of regressive primitive 
Some team members have expressed that if the patient is 
moving or seeming to respond, these are simply residual,
 reflexive, neurological impulses; an explanation 
the family has found to be dismissive.
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reflexes. A layperson might reasonably interpret 
these reflexes as meaningful behavior, and thus 
a sign of improvement.” The chief agreed, and 
went on to say she understands why everyone is 
so distressed at the notion of traching and pegging 
this patient. “Instead,” the chief went on, “it seems 
rather selfish to do things to Ms. T that will not 
make her better and that likely will leave her in a 
state where she will ultimately die of sepsis from 
wounds related to anticipatable skin breakdown.” 
To most clinicians, simply extending this patient’s 
sustain persons close to death and/or stable, but 
in a coma or persistent vegetative state (VS) in 
nursing facilities for indeterminate periods of time. 
Because the necessary resources in the U.S. exist 
to do so, for persons who can be made stable to 
discharge, it is a family decision. That is, on the 
ethical basis that those closest to the patient can 
best speak on behalf of the patient as to what kind 
of life would be worth living, physicians are no 
longer, ethically, the arbiters of a patient death if 
that patient can be made stable to discharge. 
dying process is inconsistent with the pursuit of 
virtuous medicine or nursing.
 The chief took a couple more minutes, how-
ever, to sharpen the conceptual understanding 
of the house staff’s knowledge of end-of-life care 
planning. She began by correcting an inaccuracy 
that had been brought up previously; this patient 
likely was not suffering. Because the neurology 
team believed that the patient had no cortical 
function, she could not be having the conscious 
experience of suffering. Then the chief explained 
the ethical difference between a patient who is 
actively dying and one who is well along on his or 
her death trajectory but stable enough to discharge. 
If a patient in a NeuroICU is so unstable that he or 
she cannot be discharged from the unit, it is likely 
that the patient is actively dying. If the patient is 
in fact actively dying, it is ordinarily ethically 
appropriate for physicians to start limiting life-
extending interventions as each is evaluated to no 
longer be indicated; a medical intervention being 
indicated when it provides meaningful clinical 
benefit such as increased function and/or comfort. 
Deciding what intervention is medically indicated, 
after taking a family’s or other surrogate’s express 
preferences into account to the greatest degree 
medically reasonable, remains a medical decision. 
 If the patient can be made stable enough to 
discharge, however, unlike many other countries 
around the world, in the United States we have 
not come to consensus about whether we should 
 Almost dead but stable is not synonymous 
with actively, imminently dying. Nonetheless, 
physicians are responsible for making strong 
recommendations about what they think is in 
the best interest of their patients. If they do not 
think a respirator is a good recommendation, they 
should not make it. Nevertheless, they do have to 
describe it as an alternative to comfort care, not a 
treatment, nor something from which the patient is 
likely to recover. If they think it not to be a better 
alternative, if they can communicate the facts to 
the surrogate(s) in a way that the surrogate(s) find 
their marshalling of the facts compelling, that is 
perfectly fair. That is, in fact, their job; to marshal 
the facts in an honest and nonmanipulative way 
that speaks to what’s medically indicated and what 
isn’t and why.
 Finally, the chief indicated that the group 
needed to move on to the next patient, but first 
asked the social worker to set up a family meeting 
for 3 pm that afternoon and invited as many of the 
house staff as was available. She also asked that 
the fellow, whom she expected to be at the family 
meeting, to have one of the neurologists be avail-
able to attend and to come 15 minutes early for the 
pre-family meeting.
Pre-FAMiLy MeetiNG (2:45 PM)
Chief: Thank you for coming.
Fellow: You’re welcome. Dr. Smith, our attend-
ing asked me to extend his apologies but he 
To most clinicians, simply extending this patient’s 
dying process is inconsistent with the pursuit 
of virtuous medicine or nursing.
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had to be out of the hospital today.
Chief: That’s ok. I assume you’ve familiarized 
yourself with the case?
Fellow: Yes, I have.
Chief: Good, because I want us all to be able to 
provide the family the same message if that’s 
possible. If not, I want to know where the dif-
ferences of opinion or uncertainties are so we 
can address them, transparently. Before the 
meeting begins, I’m going to quickly go over 
where I think we are, and where I think we 
should be going.
Fortunately, the neuro ICU team and the neuro-
surgical team both agree that this patient is not 
expected to recover any clinically meaningful 
function and that the neurological devastation is 
pervasive, leaving only her brain stem intact. They 
agree to load the MRI (magnetic resonance imag-
ing) pictures of the patient’s brain next to a healthy 
brain. They will have the CT (computer tomogra-
phy) scans of the patient to show the technological 
difference between CT and MRI depictions, just in 
case the conversation calls for it. 
 The chief indicates that she will lead and 
facilitate the meeting, and said she wanted the 
patient’s fellow, residents, intern, and medical 
student present in the room. In addition, that she 
would like the patient’s beside and resource nurse 
present, if possible.
FAMiLy MeetiNG (3 PM)
The chief and all the relevant team members, as 
preplanned, were already in the room when the 
social worker and patient’s nurse brought the fam-
ily. The chief and the physicians stood when the 
family came in and stayed standing until the fam-
ily was settled in their chairs. As soon as all were 
seated, the chief took gentle control of the meeting:
Chief: Hello to everyone. Before we get started 
on introductions, I just want to say how sorry 
we are that Ms. T is not doing well. We know 
how hard this has been on all of you. The 
purpose of this meeting is to review the main 
issues that have brought us here and to move 
forward with decisions regarding our next 
steps in her care. So now, let’s go around the 
room and introduce ourselves. Each of you, 
please, give us your name and how you are 
related to Ms. T. . . .
With introductions finished, the chief turns to the 
family.
Chief: Before we give you an update on how we 
see Ms. T doing and hear from you about your 
questions and concerns, I just want to say, on 
behalf of the team, that we are concerned about 
making as certain as we can that we are all fo-
cused, together, on figuring out what the next 
best steps are for your mother/sister/aunt. OK. 
I’d like to stop talking now and hear from you.
Daughter: We think she is getting better. When 
we squeeze her hand, she grasps it. When we 
kiss her or stroke her face, she tries to kiss 
us. We know you and the rest of the doctors 
and nurses don’t believe us. But we see it. We 
know you just want us to stop everything. But 
we don’t want to; we want her to have more 
time. We want you to keep doing everything.
Chief: I’m very sorry if we have given you the 
impression that we don’t believe you. I’ve just 
come on service, so I’m not sure what has been 
previously communicated, but this morning on 
rounds we were discussing together how you 
very well might be seeing the behaviors you 
have described. I believe you and I am confi-
dent that the team does, as well. We want you 
to know that we, too, want to do everything 
for Ms. T that is going to help her. 
With that, there is again a pause, but this time the 
chief picks up the conversation before anyone else 
can step in. 
Chief: So now we want to go on and talk about 
what has brought us to this point. As I under-
stand what happened, and please correct me if 
I have anything wrong, Ms. T was at home with 
you and you saw her slump over in her chair. 
You called 911. When the ambulance arrived, 
they intubated her in your home and then 
transported her to your local hospital. From 
there, she was transported here by helicopter. 
Do I have the story correct so far?
Some of the family members don’t move, but the 
ones who had been in the house give the chief 
restrained, but positive, body language.
Chief: We understand that you want us to give 
her more time before we have to have the 
conversation about whether we’re going to 
surgically place a different kind of breathing 
machine in her trachea and a tube to artificially 
feed and hydrate Ms. T, or if we’re going to shift 
our plan of care to only those interventions that 
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provide her comfort. Therefore, we are going 
to give her more time. We want to give her 
time to show us more of what you are seeing, 
and for us to help you appreciate all the things 
that we don’t think she will ever be able to do 
again. I am so sorry to have to focus us on these 
problems, but for us all, together, to make the 
best decisions for Ms. T, it’s important that we 
are all on the same page as much as we can 
be. So what I really want to focus on today, 
related to Ms. T’s medical condition, is how 
her brain is doing and what other organs may 
be sick as well. Brian, our fellow, is loading 
an MRI picture, a magnetic resonance imaging 
scan, of Ms. T’s brain. 
 As you can see from these images, her 
brain is bright and pushed to one side by this 
dark material. The bright area is the brain tis-
sue permanently damaged by the stroke. The 
dark area is the blood pushing her brain to 
the other side. The pressure from the blood 
and swelling have damaged other areas of 
her brain. This is not a picture we like to see. 
Now, look at this MRI from a healthy brain. 
. . . As you can see, there is a big difference 
between the two. Unfortunately, Ms. T had 
such a devastating stroke that the areas of her 
brain that are responsible for her ability to 
speak, understand, see, think, or communicate 
her emotions, feelings, and thoughts with the 
outside world have all been irreversibly dam-
aged.” 
sister: But this can’t be the only picture you 
have of her brain. I think she might be getting 
better; that her brain is recovering. We see her 
trying to move and squeezing our hand.
Chief: You are absolutely right. We have many 
pictures of Ms. T’s brain. Brian, please leave 
the most recent MRI up where it is and show 
us the first MRI we did the morning after she 
arrived. As you can see, the pictures look 
exactly alike. 
 We also have other kinds of pictures. Like 
most hospitals, we have CT scans, which are 
computed tomography scans. Brian, can you 
please bring up the most recent CT scan and 
the first CT that was taken? You can see that 
these scans are quite different from the MRI 
scans. The CT scans are a completely different 
kind of picture. But the pictures of her brain on 
these CT scans, too, show terrible brain devas-
tation. In a patient whose brain is so damaged 
as to be irreversibly impaired, before making 
the kind of decision that we are facing with 
Ms. T, we like to compare all of these images 
to be as certain as medicine can be that things 
are not going to get better.
The Fellow then loads side-to-side pictures of Ms. 
T’s MRI next to the MRI of a healthy brain.
 
Chief: Which brings us to where we need to be 
today. I want all of you to join with us as we 
work to agree on what is and is not what we 
term “meaningful” movement. The rest of the 
team and I know that for you any movement 
can be considered meaningful, because your 
hopes are for her improvement. However, 
what we mean when we say “meaningful” is 
a behavior that is generated consciously. The 
question is whether Ms. T is acting in response 
to external stimuli of which she is consciously 
aware in a way that demonstrates her brain 
is processing information and working well 
enough for her to willfully respond. Please be 
assured that just like you, her improvement is 
our hope as well. We always want to give our 
patients the best shot they have at turning that 
corner that will tell us there is a possibility 
that they might improve, and that’s what we’re 
going to do with Ms. T over the next two days.
 For the next two days, I want you to try 
to elicit the behaviors you are telling us you 
see. Every time you see a behavior that you 
believe is willful, call one of the nurses or 
doctors so they can document what you say 
you saw. Then, with them there, I want you 
to do whatever you had just done and see if 
you can get Ms. T to produce the behavior 
again. In addition, please, let’s all make sure 
the clinicians document everything. 
 I know that you’ve told us already you 
have seen Ms. T do things that appear mean-
ingful. I understand that you have been upset 
by hearing various clinicians tell you that 
these are likely reflexive. It’s very important 
that we all know the difference, you and us, 
and that we can document these movements 
so we can decide what’s what. Earlier today, 
and toward this end, we were talking about the 
kinds of reflexes that can appear in a patient 
whose brain has been as severely damaged as 
Ms. T’s. Dr. Johnson, our intern, explained it 
perfectly on rounds this morning, so Sandra, 
will you repeat the information you provided 
everyone this morning, please?
 intern: When babies are born and their 
palms are touched, they are likely to grip 
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your finger. That’s called a grasp reflex. When 
stroked or kissed near the corners of their 
mouth or even when a breath of air is felt in 
the corner of a baby’s mouth, the baby will turn 
toward the touch or the feel. This is called the 
“rooting” reflex. This reflex helps the baby find 
the nipple and begin feeding. Infants demon-
strate such reflexes until they are about 4 to 6 
months of age. As the central nervous system 
continues to develop, other mechanisms take 
over and this particular reflex fades away or 
is ‘overridden’ by conscious decision making 
in relation to the stimuli. In short, the person 
begins to “decide whether to grasp or turn their 
head, and so on.
Chief: It is not uncommon for patients with 
the kind of brain damage that Ms. T has suf-
fered, but who have been left with the part of 
the brain that remains involved in reflexive or 
autonomic body functions like digesting the 
food Ms. T is getting through the tube in her 
nose, to show reflexes that had been lost since 
her brain developed in infancy. Therefore, 
we’re afraid that the behaviors you are seeing, 
as opposed to signaling an improvement, may 
be a sign that her brain is getting worse. Its ac-
tivity may be mainly these primitive, reflexive 
functions rather than the kinds of willful acts 
we would need to see that would tell us that 
her overall brain function is improving. We 
have not seen any of those movements at all, 
but we would love to see them. Let’s take the 
next two days to look for them together. Let’s 
come back together 2 days from now at the 
same time, which will be this Thursday at 3 pm. 
We’ll talk about how the two days have gone. 
We’ll come back prepared to make a decision 
about whether we put the new breathing ma-
chine in her throat and the feeding tube in her 
stomach, a process that sets her up for dying of 
infection, often from the development of bed 
sores, given we know the artificial nutrition is 
never good enough to prevent skin breakdown. 
Or, whether we are going to make the hard 
decision to allow her to die comfortably here, 
in our hands. 
 If that were to happen, you can be cer-
tain that she will be comfortable throughout 
the process. You can be here with her, or if 
that’s too hard, you can say your good-byes 
and we will let you know just as soon as she 
dies. Some family members often want to 
stay, others don’t. There isn’t one right way; 
the question of how you would want to say 
your good-byes is whatever is right for you. 
In addition, I encourage you, over these next 
couple of days, to tell anyone you think should 
come in to do so and say their own good-byes, 
just in case things quickly destabilize. She’s 
“stable” now, but this is also the kind of term 
that doesn’t have the same meaning in the 
ICU that it does in everyday conversation. Ms. 
T is stable in the context of being critically 
ill. Things can change at any time. But we’ll 
think good thoughts, and see where we are on 
Thursday.
The chief looks around the room and asks if anyone 
on the hospital team has anything to add. She then 
turns back to the family.
Chief: Now, before we close this meeting, do 
any of you have anything you would like to 
ask or say?
A pause is allowed to go on until family members 
start turning toward each other and shifting around 
in their seats.
Chief: Ok. If not, perhaps you all would like to 
sit in here and talk together without us. I know 
this has been a lot to go over today. Feel free 
to stay in here as long as you’d like. 
 Thank you for having organized your 
schedules to come in this afternoon on short 
notice. I hope the next two days go smoothly.
 In this kind of family meeting, one in which 
everyone from the hospital was focused and pres-
ent, the chief was able to build trust and rapport 
and even apologized for any additional anxiety 
that had been created by the differences in opin-
ion between the team and the family. This helped 
diffuse the family’s hostility and resistance. The 
chief then demonstrated by way of the relevant 
technology what has led the medical team to their 
present assessment. This allowed the team to con-
vey important information about Ms. T’s condition 
in a way that was clear and could be understood 
significantly better than from the fragmented and 
sometimes confusing remarks of several busy clini-
cians. 
 Making clear the goal of the meeting slowed 
down a process that was going too fast for the 
family. Well-trained clinical bioethicists often 
call this pressing the “pause” button. Rather than 
being pressured by yet another group of people, 
many of whom are just a stream of constantly 
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changing faces, the chief took responsibility for 
the team and set concrete goals to be achieved in 
a specific amount of time by having the family and 
the clinicians act as true partners without asking 
them to make any life or death decisions. The chief 
emphasized how critical the circumstances were 
by telling the family to bring in others to say their 
good-byes, and reminded the family members that 
they need not be present if it’s simply too much to 
handle. Finally, the chief showed respectfulness by 
acknowledging that the family members, too, have 
busy schedules, and will hold off on discussing 
hospice or moving Ms. T to the hospital floor for 
whatever time necessary after being taken off her 
vent. 
 During Thursday’s meeting, the daughter tells 
the chief that they have come to a decision as a 
family and don’t believe their mom/sister/aunt 
would want to be kept alive on machines. The chief 
assures the family that the medical team supports 
their decision. The next day the vent is removed 
and all interventions are shifted to comfort mea-
sures only. After about 4 hours without a ventilator, 
Ms. T is transferred to a private room where she 
dies two days later with her family surrounding 
her.
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stroke patients, Mrs. J has experienced problems 
regaining her ability to speak clearly. She often 
nods her head seemingly appropriately when 
asked even fairly complex questions, but is neither 
able to cognitively find nor articulate the appropri-
ate words. What seems to be even more disturb-
ing to the patient’s husband and adult children is 
that, intermittently, she seems to not want to see 
them. Although often she is smiling and appears 
genuinely glad to see others, she can suddenly 
turn quite hostile to having anyone near her bed 
or reaching out to touch her. Further, she seems 
not to be concerned for the welfare of others when 
attempting to push away those who come near her.
 Her husband and adult children have ex-
pressed that this is not who their wife and mother 
CAse 1
Traumatic Brain Injury and Behavior: 
Understanding the Personal Affront 
as Not Personal
 Once in the Emergency Department (ED), Mrs. 
J was intubated, stabilized, and a noncontrast 
computed tomography scan (CT) was performed, 
that revealed a severe hemorrhage centered in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Soon af-
ter, she was transferred to the Neurologic Intensive 
Care Unit (NeuroICU). For the first few days, the 
patient wasn’t waking up. However, by the end 
of the first week, she was beginning to be alert to 
her husband calling her name. At this time, Mrs. 
J has been here for three weeks and is now doing 
remarkably well. She passed her swallowing test, 
has been following commands, and was success-
fully extubated two days ago. 
 Communication with Mrs. J has been frag-
mented and frustrating. As is often the case with 
Mrs. J is a 72-year-old woman who was admitted after having a massive stroke. Her 
husband saw her collapse from the kitchen window as she was gardening. He called 
911 as he ran to help her. He reported “pushing on her chest” until the ambulance 
arrived and the emergency medical technicians (EMTs) took over. The EMTs regained 
a pulse while on route to the hospital. Mrs. J has no relevant history of stroke nor is it 
a prevalent occurrence within her extended family. However, for quite some time she 
has been taking large doses of nonprescription anti-inflammatory medications to help 
manage her migraine headaches. 
PreseNtAtioN
The Editorial Group of the John J. Lynch MD Center for Ethics
Complexity: 1 2 3 4
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Damage to the region of Mrs. J’s brain in which the vascular ac-
cident occurred has been traditionally associated with
 permanent changes in relational attitudes 
and executive functioning.
was. They describe her as someone who is kind 
and conscientious, and whom happily devoted 
her life to her family and home. Their stories of 
her paint a picture of a consistently gentle and 
reasoned woman who enjoyed a relatively pri-
vate family life but who was always alert to the 
well-being of others. Her children are struggling 
to comprehend her behavior without the feeling 
that something is terribly and maybe permanently 
wrong with their mother. Mrs. J’s husband is at a 
loss as to how to deal with her and becomes emo-
tional each time his wife of 40 years lashes out 
uncharacteristically and unexpectedly towards 
him. The nursing staff is becoming increasingly 
distressed at their inability to provide what they 
consider appropriate care, and the assigned social 
worker is getting nervous because the patient’s 
increasingly hostile behavior may have negative 
implications for her rehabilitation placement. 
 Despite Mrs. J’s family’s consistently describ-
ing her as a mild-mannered person who always 
demonstrated a cooperative attitude in her rela-
tionships, including those with physicians, most 
of the neurologists in the group simply believe 
that her behavior is due to the frustration gener-
ated by her present cognitive difficulty, and her 
hostile disposition therefore likely a temporary 
symptom of an altered mental status resulting from 
the hemorrhage. However, there is one among the 
neurology group, Dr. Smithe, who is not so sure. 
He notes that although the tissue damage was not 
caused by the penetration of an external object as 
was famously the case with Phineas Gage,1 never-
theless, damage to the region of Mrs. J’s brain in 
which the vascular accident occurred has been 
traditionally associated with permanent changes 
in relational attitudes and executive functioning.2 
Dr. Smithe’s concern is that brain injuries of this 
sort have resulted in permanent changes to what 
we understand to be the person, in which case the 
nature of conversation to be had with Mrs. J’s fam-
ily changes from one about slow, rehab-dependent 
neurologic recovery in terms of capability, to no 
recovery in relation to the person Mrs. J was known 
to be. He calls a bioethics consult so he can discuss 
the ethical implications of the case with someone 
in the hospital who is likely to be more interested 
than his neurology colleagues.
ethiCAL issues 
If Dr. Smithe is right about Mrs. J’s clinical picture, 
then what his partners are attributing to passing 
secondary symptomatology may be an irreversible 
neurological problem for Mrs. J, her family, and her 
caregivers. If that is the case, the degree to which 
individuals and medical interventions are forced 
on the patient will have to do with whether the 
patient ever regains decision-making capacity. If 
she does not, a host of protections falls from that, 
such as being clear that Mrs. J’s husband continues 
to be her medical decision maker. If, for example, 
her husband were to die suddenly, who among his 
children would take over? If Mrs. J has alienated 
either her husband or any of her children, that 
may have implications for who might be the best 
surrogate for the patient. If, however, the patient 
does regain her medical decision-making capacity 
but continues to be hostile and off-putting to her 
husband, other family members, and caregivers, 
should she be allowed to make decisions that may 
not be in her medical best interest if her decisions 
are knowing, understanding, appreciating, consis-
tent and voluntary, albeit uncaring and indifferent? 
 Concerning placement, where would be a 
safe place for the patient to go for rehabilitation if 
her behavior is uncaring and hostile to others as 
to render their care ineffective, substandard, and 
dangerous to them? If no rehab facility will take 
her, can she be safely taken home?
 What if the patient recovers her motor capaci-
ties, becomes ambulatory, and perhaps is even able 
to manage the activities of daily living (ADLs) and 
recovers enough speech function to clearly dem-
onstrate to Dr. Smithe’s partners that the behav-
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iors is not some fleeting reaction to her previous 
incapacities, but likely represents an irreversible 
change? If this becomes the patient’s and family’s 
reality, the relevant ethical question becomes how 
to best assist the new Mrs. J to live a rich and ful-
filling life while managing her behaviors so they 
pose the least threat to herself and the quality of 
the relationships with and the physical safety of 
those around her.
reCoMMeNDAtioNs
1. While Mrs. J remains in the hospital, have 
the patient’s psychiatrist meet regularly with the 
husband and other family members to help them 
understand that her behavior is not a personal 
affront, although it may feel that way. Explaining 
why this is the case from a neurological perspec-
tive could help the family understand and prevent 
the patient’s unwelcoming behavior from causing 
anger and hostility for her family and caregivers.
2. Assist the staff in caring for this patient by 
conducting regular moral distress debriefings.
reAsoNiNG
Today, the literature on attempting to identify pos-
sible neurobiological correlates to morally relevant 
behaviors is vast.3-7 Clinically, Mrs. J is in many 
ways no different from any other patient, insofar 
as it is incumbent on the physician and other clini-
cians to keep up with scientific literature relevant 
to their fields, so they may work toward practicing 
evidence-based medicine. The difference here is 
that associated claims, in light of many neurosci-
entific findings, often involve a challenge to our 
sense of moral agency. Whatever such findings may 
suggest about the microphysical causes of morally 
significant behavior pushes each of us—clinicians 
and family members—to evaluate what are often 
lifelong assumptions about the causes of our own 
behavior. 
  The ethical challenge to deeply held assump-
tions about human behavior and moral decision-
making in the clinical setting involves developing 
an ability to look at the stroke patient who starts 
acting “strangely” (ie, out of character for the 
person previously known by family and friends) 
and consider the possibility that such abrupt be-
havioral changes are the psychological symptoms 
of the brain injury. At the very least, helping the 
patient’s husband, other family members, as well 
as the medical staff, to not take such manifestations 
personally will be an important part of gradually 
incorporating what we may, one day, be more fully 
able to appreciate about the behavioral effects of 
certain neurologic injuries. 
QuestioNs For DisCussioN
1. As the lead clinical ethicist on the case, how 
do you address the different long-term assess-
ments across the various neurologists? Does this 
difference of opinion make any difference in how 
the patient and family receive care while in the 
hospital?
2. How would you provide the support suggested 
by these recommendations if you are at a hospital 
without the psychiatric resources assumed in this 
case?
3. In the “Reasoning” section we write that, “The 
difference here is that associated claims in light 
of many neuroscientific findings often involve a 
challenge to our sense of moral agency.” Do you 
think this is true? Why?
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Ms. P’s community social worker, whose con-
tact information was found on the patient at the 
scene of the accident, informs the team that the 
patient has a long psychiatric history. Reportedly, 
Ms. P was a happy, healthy child until she fell 
off her bicycle and hit her head at the age of 14. 
The patient’s mother states that Ms. P knocked 
herself unconscious but not for very long. By the 
time the ambulance arrived at the hospital, she 
had regained consciousness and seemed fine. 
However, within a few months, Ms. P seemed to 
become increasingly unhappy. Her performance as 
a student, as well as her social life, began to suffer. 
During this time, her parents simply attributed the 
behavior to the hormonal and social changes that 
typically accompany puberty and adolescence. 
Ms. P’s depression seemed to worsen, however, at 
which point her pediatrician suggested a prescrip-
tion for antidepressants.
 Ms. P’s depression seemed to improve, but ac-
cording to the patient’s history, during this period 
is when the suicide attempts began. The first few 
manifestations of her suicidal ideation began as 
merely parasuicidal gestures. Since then, the pa-
tient has made many such gestures, but has also 
begun to make serious suicide attempts. To date, 
Ms. P has committed seven suicide attempts, or 
parasuicides, several of which have come very 
close to killing her and have left her with damaged 
organs, fractured bones, unilateral blindness, and 
impaired hearing. Today, at 37, Ms. P has trouble 
walking and has received numerous surgeries to 
address what damage has occurred. Her condition 
is the result of several attempts to be hit by oncom-
ing vehicle traffic or to step off cliffs while hiking 
in the mountains. 
 Ms. P has undergone years of inconsistent and 
unsuccessful electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). 
Deep Brain Stimulation and Chronic 
Parasuicidal Depression: Neurologic 
Research and Clinical Care
The Editorial Group of the John J. Lynch MD Center for Ethics
Complexity: 1 2 3 4
CAse 2
PreseNtAtioN
Ms. P is a 37-year-old female in the hospital’s surgical intensive care unit (SICU), s/p 
(status post) surgical repair of several broken bones resulting from being struck by a bus 
during a suicide attempt. She is ventilated and sedated but able to follow commands. 
Her kidneys are intact and she is producing urine. She is breathing over the vent and 
has a gag reflex. The team is planning to attempt extubating within the next 48 hours. 
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Also present is a measurable decline in cognitive 
function related to higher order decision making 
post parasuicidal events. This will occasionally 
result in obvious but temporary decisional impair-
ment. In most cases, Ms. P has regained sufficient 
capacity once the acute event and its sequelae (eg 
ventilator support) are over. She, nevertheless, 
depends on her social worker to navigate through 
the complexities of the healthcare system. 
 For this reason, although Ms. P has a court-
appointed community social worker, she has never 
had a guardian.1 Her mother cares about her greatly 
and talks with her often, but is said by the clinical 
team to be clearly suffering from caretaker fatigue. 
This, and the fact that she resides in another state, 
have contributed to her inability to continue to be 
a part of her daughter’s daily life. Ms. P receives 
Social Security disability payments, which she 
manages with the help of her social worker. Her 
attempts at completing an academic career have 
been marginally successful, but she has had dif-
ficulty retaining a job.
 Ms. P has been intermittently institutionalized, 
treated with every indicated neuropharmacologi-
cal and/or psychotherapeutic intervention since 
her first antidepressant prescription. None of these 
interventions has proven to assist Ms. P’s chronic 
parasuicidal depression. Now, with the SICU team 
moving toward extubation, the neuro intensiv-
ist on the team suggests deep brain stimulation 
(DBS). The technology has not been approved by 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
treat Ms. P’s psychiatric condition, but has shown 
promise in studies for severe, chronic depression. 
The team knows that it is, however, FDA-approved 
and widely used in Parkinson’s Disease. The SICU 
team is unsure about making this recommendation 
given that the use of such a technology to attempt 
to treat major depressive disorders is merely in the 
trial stage. The attending intensivist requests that 
a bioethicist join the conversation. 
ethiCAL issues
DBS has been approved by the FDA to treat neu-
rological symptoms associated with Parkinson’s 
disease, as well as behavioral issues associated 
with a psychological diagnosis of obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder (OCD). Clinical trials are just now 
producing data for a proper evaluation of its use 
in depression. 
 Does Ms. P’s depression/suicidality make her 
chronically incapable of such a decision and /
or is her neurological condition of the kind that 
would respond to DBS in the way intended? Al-
though her decision-making capacity (DMC) has 
not been an issue in the past, before researchers 
are even contacted, this needs to be assessed. 
Whether DBS trials are clinically appropriate, or 
if she is not a candidate because her “depression” 
is caused by a structural injury to the brain and 
thus will likely not respond to electrochemical 
treatments intended to work on intact neurology, 
is an assessment the research team needs to make. 
That is, evaluating depression, as a psychological 
disorder, does not point us to a specific, micro-
physical (neurological) cause in every case. For 
example, often-depressed persons will respond 
in some way to serotonin-based treatments, but 
Ms. P did not demonstrate any improvements 
when antidepressants were attempted. If DBS for 
depression is appropriate for clinical trials in light 
of the electrochemical reaction that occurs from 
its physiological introduction, and the depressive 
behavior is somehow linked to her accident at the 
age of 14, then it may be reasonable to suspect (as 
the general consensus amongst her careproviders 
has been) that the cause in this case is associated 
with a change in neurological structure having pos-
sibly resulted from the injury, and not chemically 
caused, in which case DBS may be of no benefit 
at all. 
 Thinking about assisting Ms. P to apply for 
study eligibility raises additional ethical questions. 
These include:
1. Ought the SICU team assist this patient in get-
ting into a DBS trial in the area? 
2. What is the SICU team’s scope of responsibility 
related to assisting a patient in seeking eligibil-
ity screening (eg potential problems in assuring 
that Ms. P consistently participates, as opposed 
to repeating the fragmented commitment of her 
previously attempted programs of care, such as 
with ECT)?
3. Is Ms. P fully aware of the nature of any poten-
tial participation in DBS trials as purely that of a 
neurological research subject and not of a patient 
receiving prescribed treatment? 
4. Is DBS appropriate, even in a clinical trial 
setting, for someone in Ms. P’s neurological condi-
tion? 
5. If considered fully decisionally capacitated, 
what about assisting Ms. P in a successful suicide?
 Presently, there is no tension amongst values 
that have been espoused in relation to the patient’s 
care plan. Ms. P is improving and is expected to 
be removed from the ventilator and to begin com-
municating, at which point she will be assigned a 
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sitter by hospital policy. Moreover, her suicidality 
will be frequently assessed. If she is not immedi-
ately suicidal, and she no longer requires inten-
sive care, she will be moved to the floor (out of 
intensive care), and will continue to be monitored 
(many hospitals implement policies that require 
any patient who has been deemed suicidal during 
admission to be assigned a sitter throughout his 
or her stay, to both protect the patient’s safety and 
limit the hospital’s liability). If Ms. P does appear 
immediately suicidal and meets certain evaluative 
1. The patient’s team should do enough research 
to find relevant studies in DBS in depression to 
provide the patient and her community social 
worker prior to discharge.
2. If the patient seems at all interested, a physi-
cian on the SICU team should take enough time 
to explain to her the basic differences between 
neurological research and clinical care. 
reAsoNiNG
In the face of Ms. P’s certain death by suicide at 
some point in the future, the clinical team natu-
criteria, she will either be admitted on a voluntary 
or involuntary basis to a neighboring hospital’s 
psychiatric unit, and won’t be discharged until 
her care team believes she is able to function on 
her own as well as she did prior to her most recent 
parasuicide. (She could not stay at the hospital 
where she is now and be involuntarily commit-
ted; there are jurisdictional rules against it. Also, 
conflicts of interest could easily arise). However, 
nobody is sanguine; she is bound to try again.
reCoMMeNDAtioNs
Clinicians are more likely to know about research 
on the developing use of DBS technology than 
patients are. Since there is no reason to suspect 
that Ms. P will not regain her decisional capacity, 
once she does, informing her of existing DBS trials, 
whether one expects a direct potential benefit or 
not, is not only ethically permissible, but ethically 
optimal. When the situation is as dire as it is for 
this patient, the risk/benefit analysis is obvious. 
Communicating to Ms. P about neuroscientific re-
search trials seeking subjects is nothing but giving 
a capacitated, self-determining patient important 
and relevant information that she can put to good 
use, regardless of her subsequent decision. 
 With the need for continued intervention for a 
mentally ill patient post-discharge, when it comes 
to a kind of neuroscientific research being the only 
medical intervention not yet tried, an evenhanded 
approach to both provision of research informa-
tion and encouragement of acting on that research 
information is ethically appropriate. 
rally feels concerned about discharging her. This 
patient is in a perilous condition and likely to die 
by way of her psychological disease if some benefi-
cial intervention is not found. Although her future 
suicidality is not the direct responsibility of the 
SICU team, even with the input of the psychiatry 
department, the prospect of having their patient 
heal from her somatic injuries, be psychopharma-
cologically treated sufficiently to regain capacity, 
be discharged, and then succeed at killing herself 
the next time, makes everyone on the team deeply 
disturbed. 
 So the reasoning here, like much ethical deci-
sion making in medicine, is one of weighing risks 
and benefits. When a patient is being discharged 
from a hospital and there is a variety of FDA-
approved interventions still to try, there is no need 
to contemplate whether physicians in the clinical 
setting ought to be reaching into the research world 
for assistance. In the case of Ms. P, there is nothing 
left in the clinical medicine world she has not tried 
and has found wanting. Because of the potential 
lethality of her parasuicidal events, the situation 
calls for thinking outside the normal boundaries of 
what might be expected of physicians in the clini-
cal setting for coming up with something beyond 
the hospital’s walls that might help this patient. 
 DBS, like many neuroscientific technologies, 
is coming into frequent use in the clinical setting. 
Today the beneficial outcomes for Parkinson’s 
patients of DBS is well established.2,3 There are 
a variety of neuromodulatory techniques on the 
horizon.4-6 Already DBS is FDA-approved for OCD, 
When the situation is as dire as it is for this patient,
 the risk/benefit analysis is obvious. 
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although the use of DBS in depression is still medi-
cally and ethically controversial, with use mostly 
restricted to the research setting.7-10
 Therefore, as long as the physicians in this 
case are evenhanded in their presentation of the 
possibility of entering a neuroscientific clinical 
trial in DBS and depression, this seems in many 
ways no different from physicians with no other 
interventions to offer any other dying patient. 
Given this patient’s history, it is quite likely that, 
if left untreated, she could be dead of her suicidal-
ity in 6 to 12 months. The desperation one feels 
points towards a risk/benefit analysis for DBS in 
a patient that is tipped in favor of her trying the 
neurotechnology, even as a research subject. If it is 
available, even if merely in the research setting, it 
seems worthwhile not only to provide the informa-
tion, but also to encourage the patient to consider 
it.
QuestioNs For DisCussioN
1. How far ought the care provided by the treat-
ing team extend in response to the patient’s likely 
future suicidality?
2. In what ways ought the provision of research 
information differ, if at all, from provision of 
information about alternative treatments that are 
already FDA-approved and in well-established 
use?
3. Given that this patient’s decision-making 
capacity is frequently in question, what levels of 
guardianship might be best recommended for this 
particular patient?
4. How ought an ethicist to approach, if at all, 
matters related to the clinical appropriateness of 
a research trial, when she/he notices an important 
distinction in relation to the patient’s eligibility 
and about which the medical team appears un-
aware?
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On this admission, Mr. B presented to the Emer-
gency Department because of problems taking his 
anti-seizure medications. The patient reports that 
he does not like to take his medications because 
they make him “foggy.” While hospitalized, Mr. B 
has seized several times, after which, he has made 
several inappropriate sexual advances toward sev-
eral female nurses on the floor. When the advances 
cease and the behavior is addressed with the pa-
tient, he becomes placid and appears shamed and 
remorseful. It has now been discovered that he has 
experienced post-ictal episodes of hypersexuality 
at home, during which he has forced sexual inter-
course on his wife. The wife is now expressing fear 
of taking the patient home without his agreement 
to continue to take his anti-seizure medication. 
This is of special concern to both Mr. B and his 
wife, as they fear the behavior could begin to turn 
toward their two teenage daughters. 
 Psychiatry has been called to assess the pa-
tient and he has been determined to be decision-
ally capacitated, even if unable to manage these 
symptoms while they are occurring. Social work 
has said that the patient does not qualify for long-
term care and the patient and his wife want him 
to be able to live at home. A family meeting with 
the patient, his wife, and the neurologists caring 
for him both in the hospital and as an outpatient, 
has been scheduled and the neurologists have 
requested that a bioethicist be involved.
ethiCAL issues 
The ethical issues center on how to allow the 
patient to be at home, taking the lowest dose of 
Hypersexuality and Neuropharmacology:
Kluver-Bucy Syndrome
The Editorial Group of the John J. Lynch MD Center for Ethics
Complexity: 1 2 3 4
CAse 3
The patient, Mr. B, is a 46-year-old male. Over a year ago, Mr. B began demonstrating 
a cluster of symptoms associated with Kluver-Bucy syndrome (KBS), a rare neurologi-
cal disorder thought to be caused by bilateral lesions to the medial temporal lobe and 
manifested in a rare combination of behavioral symptoms including profound memory 
loss, dietary changes, distractibility, hypersexuality, and recurrent unprovoked seizures. 
PreseNtAtioN 
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medications feasible while controlling the seizures 
and thus any post-ictal or otherwise episodes of 
hypersexuality. Ethically, it is important to sup-
port this capacitated patient’s autonomous wish 
to be at home while balancing what situation can 
be arranged that is in the patient’s best interest 
related to the need for safety for him, his wife, and 
their daughters, as well as the nurses while he is 
in the hospital.
reCoMMeNDAtioNs
1. With treatment, Mr. B’s symptoms may slowly 
decline, therefore, it is important to set up a tightly 
managed outpatient regimen of symptomatic and 
supportive care. This will include whatever is the 
drug regimen, as well as whatever psychotherapy 
can be arranged for the patient and his wife.
2. Prior to discharge, social work should make a 
home visit to evaluate with the intention of creat-
ing a safe environment for the patient, his wife, and 
daughters. This could include separate sleeping 
quarters for the husband and wife, with locks on 
bedroom doors so the wife and/or daughters can 
lock themselves in if needed. 
3. While the patient is still in the hospital, psy-
chiatry should establish a relationship with the 
patient that is to be continued on an outpatient 
basis.
4. While still in the hospital, if the patient begins 
to act inappropriately towards any nurse, the nurse 
should walk out of the room. If the patient requires 
a nurse at that moment, a call should immediately 
be made for someone else to enter the room to help 
manage the patient’s behavior. 
reAsoNiNG
Kluver-Bucy Syndrome is a rare neurobehavioral 
condition in humans.1,2 The condition was first 
described in 1937 as an experimental neurobehav-
ioral syndrome in monkeys with bitemporal brain 
lesions3 as an impairment that is associated with 
damage to both of the anterior temporal lobes of 
the brain. A hallmark symptom is hypersexual-
ity, including a report in the literature of forced 
spousal intercourse.4 
 Although not life threatening, a patient with 
this condition can be difficult to treat and manage. 
Prognosis is variable but may not be permanent.5,6 
There is an increasing group of drugs that have 
shown efficacy in treating this condition. Even 
though little is understood about the disorder 
and its treatment, it has been long reported that 
carbamazepine can be useful.7-9 Various cocktails 
of carbamazepine, clonidine, quetiapine, and 
methylphenidate have demonstrated treatment 
utility.10,11
 Because there is growing evidence of treat-
ability, it will be important for the neurologists 
treating Mr. B to find the drug combination that 
works best for the patient. In light of the fact that he 
came into the hospital complaining that his present 
drug regimen was unsatisfactory and because of 
the need to protect others from his hypersexuality, 
close monitoring and medication adjustments will 
be important elements of his care. 
 Further, it has been reported12 that social 
stimulation is a critical component of post-injury 
healing in Kluver-Bucy Syndrome, and a social 
worker’s home visit may help the patient and his 
wife arrange their living environment to maximize 
meeting this need. Although a home visit by a 
social worker is certainly out of the ordinary in 
today’s hospital care, in this rare case it seems 
reasonable when considering how to best employ 
an interdisciplinary team in the patient’s best in-
terest. 
 Finally, staff safety has to be fully addressed. 
Although the patient’s hypersexual behavior to-
wards the nurses is a symptom associated with his 
syndrome and not considered vicious behavior, 
the safety of clinical staff should be prioritized. 
Additional and especially capable personnel may 
be required in his room during post-ictal periods 
until the neurology team has determined a better 
dosing regimen. Nevertheless, nurses should not be 
subjected to inappropriate behavior. Unless there 
is an emergency, if the behavior starts, then they 
should walk out of the patient’s room. Whenever 
possible, two nurses should attend to the patient 
when nursing is required.
QuestioNs For DisCussioN
1. If a patient exhibits behaviors that are threat-
ening and such behaviors can be medically ad-
dressed, does that patient have a responsibility to 
adhere to his treatment regimen, regardless of its 
noxious side-effects?
2. The case and recommendations call for the 
patient’s adherence to the prescribed regimen to be 
“tightly monitored.” Is this constraint reasonable?
3. How far should the hospital go to protect the 
patient’s nurses from his inappropriate behavior? 
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4. What are your thoughts on the implementation 
of hospital policies designed to both understand 
and better address the safety of similarly neurologi-
cally injured patients and their caregivers?
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Dear JOHE Readers,
It is with great sadness that I inform you of the 
death of John J. “Jack” Lynch, MD, Associate 
Director, Cancer Institute, Emeritus and Medical 
Director, Emeritus, Center for Ethics, MedStar 
Washington Hospital Center. Jack, an oncologist, 
bioethicist, and leading voice on clinical ethics in 
the Washington, DC, community, died on January 
18, 2016, of natural causes; he was 87 years old. 
We are grateful to report he died quickly and did 
not suffer. 
 Jack, whose father was a physician and whose 
mother was the daughter of a pharmacist, was the 
first medical oncologist in Washington. He worked 
for over 50 years with MedStar Washington Hospi-
tal Center (MWHC). His vision of comprehensive 
cancer treatment led to the creation of the MedStar 
Washington Cancer Institute. “It’s here because of 
his vision,” according to Brian McCagh, a former 
vice president of Oncology Services at the institute. 
It is now DC’s largest cancer care provider.
 Jack established the ethics committee in 1982, 
out of which the Center for Ethics was established 
soon thereafter. It is so true that those of us who 
had the honor of working with Jack or learning 
from him are better for it. I had the privilege of 
both for 30 years. My time with Jack started when 
a DC-specific group was convened by Joan Lewis, 
then of the DC Hospital Association, a project that 
was largely due to Jack. I had the opportunity to 
get to know Jack through these quarterly programs 
while I was still at the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH). When my NIH research ethics fellowship 
was over, I moved to the Center for Ethics. That 
was 18 years ago. Moreover, if today I know any-
thing about the medical side of clinical ethics, it 
is mostly because of Jack. 
 Jack epitomized the virtuous physician. In 
training residents and medical students how to 
become physicians of sound ethical judgement and 
integrity, he was tireless. Up to 36 hours before he 
died, he was doing what we all had known him to 
love doing for all those years; he was sitting with 
us, at the Center for Ethics, talking together so we 
could collaboratively try to figure out how best to 
assist a patient, his family, and the clinicians who 
were caring for him. Every day, when I come into 
the Center, where he sat is what I see first. There is 
not a day that goes by that one of us does not ask, 
“What might Jack have thought?” By all accounts, 
he was exemplary in every way and his legacy is 
vast. A jewel in that crown is the Center for Ethics. 
We at the Center are committed to carrying on his 
work. His death has left a huge hole in our hearts. 
 We do have some good news: the Center has 
been named the John J. Lynch MD Center for Eth-
ics at MedStar Washington Hospital Center. Better 
still, Jack knew this was in the works before he 
died. We look forward to the changes the naming 
will bring. In addition to all the wonderful things I 
have already told you about Jack, he was a devoted 
in MeMorY
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and superior medical editor who loved his work on 
this journal. He is, and will continue to be, sorely 
missed.
Sincerely,
Evan
Evan G. DeRenzo, PhD
Editor-in-Chief
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